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Protecting free speech and academic freedom in universities 
Ian Cram, University of Leeds 
Helen Fenwick, University of Durham 
 
Abstract 
This article interrogates restrictions on speaking events in universities created both by recent 
student-led efforts at ‘no-platforming’ and by Part 5 of the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 
2015 which placed aspects of the government’s existing Prevent strategy on a statutory basis 
for the first time. The statutory Prevent duty as it applies in universities includes, under the 
accompanying Guidance, curbing or monitoring such events on the basis that they could have 
an impact in drawing persons into terrorism. This article will place the combined impact of 
Part 5 and student-led curbs on campus speech in context by juxtaposing a range of pre-existing 
restrictions with the various free speech duties of universities. Focusing on speaking events, it 
sets out to evaluate the results of this chequered situation in terms of the current state of free 
speech and academic freedom in universities. It finds potential violations of established free 
speech norms due to the impact of pre-emptive strikes against some campus-linked speech 
articulating non-mainstream viewpoints. But it also argues that not all such speech has a strong 
foundation within such norms. 
 
Key words: ‘Prevent’ duty, student no-platforming policies, universities, Article 10 ECHR, 
Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015, Human Rights Act, speech values   
 
A. Introduction  
This article analyses curbs on speaking events in universities created both by Part 5 of the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) and recent student ‘no-platforming’ 
policies. Part 5 in effect placed expression-related aspects of the government’s existing Prevent 
strategy1 on a statutory basis for the first time. It has not so far been the subject of  sustained 
academic examination that takes account of its first years of operation, in the context of student-
led curbs on speech and of provisions and practices either restricting or promoting on-campus 
expression.2 The Part 5 provisions are intended to address the risk of persons being drawn into 
terrorism by placing duties on certain authorities, including universities, to prevent the risk 
arising by, inter alia, placing certain curbs on ‘extremist expression’.3 The duty4 includes 
disallowing or monitoring the expression of visiting speakers on the basis that it could aid in 
the radicalisation of students.  
Further cognate developments have arisen since Part 5 was introduced. They include the 
                                                 
1
 See Home Office Countering International Terrorism (London: Cm 6888, 2006); Pursue, Prevent, Protect, 
Prepare: the UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (London: Cm 7547, 2009). See now at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/prevent-duty. The strategy is outlined in Policy paper 2010-2015 
Government policy: counter-terrorism, updated 8.5.15. 
2
 See J. Blackbourn and C. Walker for an early commentary: ‘Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015’ (2016) 79 MLR 840. See also S. Greer, S and L. Bell, 'Counter-terrorist law in 
British universities: a review of the “Prevent” debate' (2018) Public Law 84-105. 
3
 See CTSA ss 26-33. For ss26 and 29 and the accompanying Guidance for Higher Education Institutions, see 
notes 101, 104 and 110 below.  
4
 The duty is applicable to England, Wales and Scotland, and took effect in HEIs on 21.9.15. 
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appointment of a Commission for Countering Extremism headed by a counter-extremism 
‘tszar’ who will make recommendations with a view to addressing what the Home Secretary 
(at the time, Amber Rudd) has called the ‘scourge of extremism in all its forms’.5 The Prime 
Minister and Home Secretary also confirmed in 2017 that there would be a review and 
expansion of the Prevent anti-radicalisation programme.6  At the same time concerns have been 
expressed as to the impact on campus free speech of student ‘no-platforming’ policies, leading 
to a proposal to fine universities that fail to uphold free speech7  and to a significant Report on 
campus speech from the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) in 2018.8 The Office for 
Students (OfS), operative from April 2018,9 has also been established, intended inter alia to 
stand up against censorship on campus.10 The Higher Education Minister has expressed the 
hope that the OfS will ensure that university students are exposed to ‘new and uncomfortable 
ideas, and engage in robust, civil debate and challenge.’11  
Taking account of these nascent developments, this article focuses on the conflicting pressures 
on campus opposing or protecting free speech and academic freedom, in order to offer an 
original contribution to the existing legal literature. Pre-emptive strikes against speech 
articulating non-orthodox and dissenting viewpoints may on several grounds be considered 
problematic, given the core mission of universities to protect free speech and critique a range 
of orthodoxies in the name of academic freedom. The pre-existing provisions and practices, 
Part 5 and student ‘no-platforming’ and ‘safe space’ policies taken together can fairly be said 
to aid in fostering an intellectual environment within which restrictions on free speech may be 
condoned. But in critiquing these conflicting pressures, this article will also reflect on the extent 
to which some expression that may potentially be barred from campus genuinely engages free 
speech values.   
 
B. Pre-existing law and practice underpinning the curbing of speech 
on campus 
 
Placement of the Prevent duty on a statutory basis, covering on-campus expression, could be 
viewed as unnecessary since a range of criminal offences already existed that could be invoked 
against certain speakers or materials in universities. Any university that apprehended the 
commission of one of those offences would have been expected to take preventive action, under 
                                                 
5
 The appointee, Sara Khan, is tasked with providing a comprehensive report into the scale, influence and reach 
of extremism in Britain: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sara-khan-to-lead-commission-for-countering-
extremism. See further n 103.  
6
 See n 102.  
7
 Sam Gyimah MP HC Debs (2017-18) Vol.363, col.695: The power to fine universities is given to the Office for 
Students by the Higher Education and Research Act 2017  
8
 Joint Committee on Human Rights Freedom of Speech in Universities (4th Report of Session 2017-19) 27.3.18, 
at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/589/589.pdf (accessed 15.4.18). 
9
 It has taken over a number of HEFCE’s regulatory functions for the University sector functions after HEFCE 
was abolished on 1.4.18. See n 117 below. 
10
 Freedom of speech was included in a standard list of ‘public interest principles’ which would form part of the 
‘public interest governance condition’ applying to the ‘Approved’ categories of universities. For problems 
surrounding the appointment of OfS members, see C Phipps and others ‘Toby Young resigns from the Office for 
Students after backlash’ The Guardian 9.1.18.  
11 Sam Gyimah MP HC Debs (2017-18) Vol. 363, col.28 WS.    
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existing duties.12 The perception that one of these offences might arise has been relied on by 
university authorities to cancel speaking events or withdraw invitations to speakers, while the 
Public Sector Equality duty also has the potential to lead to the curbing of some expression on 
campus. That duty and the various criminal offences are reflected in the university Codes of 
Practice promulgated in response to the section 43 Education (No 2) Act 1986 duty to promote 
free speech (discussed in full in Part F), and applying to campus speaking events, including 
those organized by student societies. That can sometimes mean, as discussed below, that they 
may be cancelled or minimized on the basis of an over-cautious or over-expansive conception 
of the legal requirements. Since student organisers of such events must comply with the Codes, 
the provisions discussed below have an indirect impact on Student Unions and their affiliates, 
which are also directly affected by Charity Commission Guidance, as discussed in Part E. 
 
Counter-terror and hate speech offences 
 
A range of speech-based counter-terror offences could overlap with some speech potentially 
caught by Part 5. A speaker in a university who directly or indirectly encouraged acts of 
terrorism via oral or written expression, which included glorifying such acts, whether in the 
past, the future or generally, would commit an offence, depending on the response of the 
audience, and the speaker’s intention.13 A range of offences are also available relating to 
meetings and expression supporting proscribed groups.14 The dedicated hate speech provisions 
under Part III of the Public Order Act (POA) 1986, as amended, could also conceivably apply 
on campus if expression stirring up hatred on grounds of race, religion or sexual orientation, 
was expected to be promulgated. These provisions are so narrowly drawn, however, especially 
in relation to the latter two categories - where the expression must be intended to stir up hatred, 
and must be ‘threatening’15 - that their application would be extremely rare or non-existent if 
taken into account by university authorities or student societies pre-emptively before the event 
to consider the risk posed by speakers.  
 
Public order offences 
 
In contrast, the far broader Part I POA sections 4A and 5 provisions, which can arise in racially 
or religiously aggravated forms,16 could more readily cover visiting speakers or anticipated 
protests concerning them arising on-campus, including inside lecture halls or other educational 
                                                 
12
 Prior to 2015, see the Guidance from universities UK 2013 on external speakers 
(http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/external-speakers-in-higher-education-
institutions.aspx (accessed 15.4.18)) suggesting that universities should consider what assurances might be sought 
from high-risk speakers if concerns were raised that they might breach the criminal law. 
13
 The Terrorism Act 2006 s1(1) prohibits the publishing of ‘a statement that is likely to be understood by some 
or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement…to them to the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences’. This very broad provision is 
qualified in a number of respects by s1(2), providing that a person commits the offence if ‘(b) at the time he does 
so, he intends the statement to be understood as mentioned in sub-section (1) or is reckless as to whether or not it 
is likely to be so understood’. Under s1(3) the statements of indirect encouragement must be ones ‘(b)…from 
which those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being 
glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances’. 
14
 Under the Terrorism Act 2000 s12(2) it is an offence to arrange a meeting (3 or more persons) which the 
organiser knows is to support a proscribed organisation, and under s 12(3) it is an offence to address a meeting to 
encourage support for such an organisation. 
15
 Note also the ‘free speech’ defence available under Public Order Act 1986, s29J (relating to inciting hatred on 
grounds of religion).  
16
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s31(1)(c). 
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meeting places.17 The provisions specifically allowing regulation or banning of processions 
and assemblies in POA sections 11-13, are also viewed by universities as relevant to gatherings 
on campus,18 as is the very broad common law doctrine of breach of the peace which overlaps 
with these statutory provisions.19 Section 5 criminalises use of threatening or abusive words20 
and the display of threatening or abusive visible representations,21 within the hearing or sight 
of a person ‘likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’. The offence under 
section 4A is similar, as are the defences,22 except that it could cover some merely offensive 
expression on campus due to its inclusion of the term ‘insulting’, 23  but in that case the 
harassment, alarm or distress must actually have been caused to a person,24 and intentionally 
so.25  
 
Section 4A also has a further potential application to expression associated with speaking 
events in universities since it can be applied to cyber-speech,26 unlike section 5, since there is 
no requirement that the words used must be within hearing or sight of a person likely to be 
caused harassment, alarm or distress. So it could arise not only in respect of on-campus 
inflammatory speech, but also in respect of its digital expression — for example, if talks were 
‘live-tweeted’ or reported on web pages.27 Clearly, it is unlikely that arrests would occur on 
campus; far more significantly, the existence of these provisions has quite frequently led risk-
averse universities to bar speakers, abandon speaking events or demand that gatherings should 
be minimized.28 
 
General communication offences 
 
The remarkably broad offence under section 127(1) Communications Act 2003 applies only in 
the context of electronic communications, so it could potentially apply (overlapping with 
section 4A) to online advertising or reporting on speaking events in any university, and 
probably also to using skype to allow students to hear from a speaker outside the UK, who may 
                                                 
17
 The offences expressly do not apply to ‘dwelling’ places, which would cover eg student accommodation, but 
not seminar rooms etc. 
18
 See eg the University of Cambridge s43 Code, at [7]. 
19
 If the assembly went ahead, police officers could intervene if a reasonably apprehended breach of the peace 
was considered imminent: Laporte v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] 2 WLR 46. 
20
 A person is guilty of the offence only if he intends his words or behaviour to be (or is aware that they may be) 
threatening or abusive (s6(4)). 
21
 The word ‘insulting’ was removed from s5 in 2014 by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 57, but not from s4A. 
22
 Under s5 and s4A the accused has a defence if it is proved that his conduct was reasonable.  
23
 But CPS Guidance indicates that the terms ‘insulting’ and ‘abusive’ overlap (CPS ‘Public Order Offences 
incorporating the Charging Standard’ (2013) at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/ 
(accessed 15.4.18)). 
24
 The words etc can be targeted at one person but take effect on another. 
25
 Under s4A there must be intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, and the verbal or written threats, 
abuse, or insults must cause that or ‘another person harassment, alarm or distress’. 
26
 The internet has been viewed as ‘public space’ for section 4A purposes: in S v DPP [2008] 1 WLR 2847; and 
R v Stacey Appeal No: A20120033 30.3.12. 
27
 A charge (which was then dropped) under s127 (and under s1 Malicious Communications Act 1988) arose in 
the university context: ‘Bahar Mustafa: Student officer who allegedly posted “kill all white men” to face malicious 
communications charges’ T Brooks-Pollock, the Independent 6.10.15. 
28
 See n 58 below.  
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have been banned from entering the country.29 It covers the ‘improper use of a public electronic 
communications network’; the content of the message (or other material) must be ‘grossly 
offensive or…of a menacing character’, which has been found to cover racist material.30 It is 
clearly an over-broad offence, including no express mens rea31 or defence, in contrast to section 
4A POA.32 In this context any material posted on a web-site linked to a university speaking 
event or society could be a ‘communication’ (if not a ‘message’) in the sense that it is intended 
to be read by others. How far universities or student societies are aware of this offence in 
relation to the use of social media relating to a speaking event is debatable, but its profile is 
rising since it is now clearly established as the key offence to rely on in relation to offensive 
digital expression. 33  In so far as it might be taken into account in decisions as to the 
organization of such events, awareness of prosecution policy, which is to use restraint in 
deploying it,34 would be significant in avoiding an over-cautious response to its existence.35 
 
Anti-discrimination provisions and policies 
 
The Public Sector Equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 means that state universities are 
obliged to have due regard to the need to: foster good relations between persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic and those who do not,36 which would include good relations 
between heterosexuals and homosexuals, or between religious adherents and atheists. That 
latter function includes the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation. 37 
Student unions also have duties under the Act as associations, and at times as employers and 
service providers; therefore they must not unlawfully discriminate against students, employees, 
customers, members or guests. The duty overlaps with the non-discrimination provisions of 
Article 14 ECHR38  under section 6 Human Rights Act 1998, which impose positive and 
negative obligations on state universities, not student unions,39 so long as the instance falls 
                                                 
29
 See R (on the application of Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1546 
where the bar on entry to a supporter of Osama Bin Laden did not however extend to his communications via a 
video link to university students. 
30
 See DPP v Collins [2006] 1 WLR 2223 (on appeal from [2005] EWHC 1308 (Admin)), Lord Bingham, at [9].  
31
 s127(2), which covers messages that the speaker ‘knows to be false’, clearly does require mens rea. By contrast, 
an equivalent requirement appears to have been deliberately omitted from s127(1) in contrast to the otherwise 
somewhat similar offence under s1 Malicious Communications Act 1988. However, Lord Bingham in DPP v 
Collins ibid read into s127(1) a mens rea of intention to insult or of a form of objective recklessness — that the 
accused would have been expected to recognise that the message would insult those to whom the message relates 
(regardless of the reaction of the actual recipient). 
32
 But now not as excessively wide as was originally accepted in Chambers v DPP [2013] 1 WLR 1833. See 
further J. Rowbottom, ‘To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech’ (2012) 71 CLJ 355. 
33
 See: R v Sorley and Nimmo, sentencing: 24.1.14; S. Lavell, ‘Internet troll who sent Labour MP anti-semitic 
messages is jailed’ the Guardian, 10 March 2017; Oral Evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee ‘Hate 
Crime and its Violent Consequences’ (2017) HC 609, covering online abuse.   
34
 See CPS ‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media’ 
(https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-media-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-involving-communications-
sent-social-media (accessed 15.4.18). 
35
 However, abuse, under recent CPS guidelines, is to be treated as being as serious online as offline: BBC News 
‘Hate crimes: Online abuse as serious as face-to-face' (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40981235,  accessed 
15.4.18). 
36
 s149 Equality Act. See the guidance on this duty: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/equality-act-2010-
guidance#public-sector-equality-duty (February 2013) (accessed 15.4.18). 
37
 Ibid.  
38
 Article 14 covers a wider range of groups than does the Duty, of relevance in this context, because it extends 
to ‘political or other opinions’. 
39
 Given that universities are bound by the ECHR as public authorities. 
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within the ambit of another Article (probably in this context Articles 11, 10 or 8).40  
The equality duty also requires universities to consider whether its policies contribute to 
providing equality of opportunity for all and to tackling discrimination. As a result, equality 
concerns have been cited as a basis for banning UKIP speakers41 or potentially homophobic 
ones.42 Certain Islamic preachers/speakers have reportedly aided in creating an intimidating 
atmosphere on some campuses, affecting in particular LGBT students,43 arguably infringing 
the equality duty. The same can be said of allowing or imposing gender-segregated seating at 
some speaking events hosted by certain University Islamic societies,44 a matter cited as a 
concern in 2016 by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.45  
 
Guidance from the Equality and Human Rights Commission as to the equality duty in 
universities 46  has recently confirmed that gender segregation, involving seating men and 
women separately at an event, is not permitted at events which are not acts of religious 
worship.47 That includes academic meetings, speaking events, lectures or meetings organised 
for and attended by students, members of the public or employees of the university or students 
union, whether or not held on university premises. The Guidance makes it clear that genuinely 
voluntary gender segregation is permissible under the law, but that explicit or implicit pressure 
on women or men to sit in certain parts of the hall would render the segregation non-voluntary. 
However, the Commission takes the view that it would be impracticable for organisers to attain 
the necessary certainty that, at every stage, segregation was demonstrably voluntary for all 
individuals. It has found that while universities must respect religious freedom, that cannot 
                                                 
40
 Article 10 could be engaged on the basis that the creation of an intimidatory atmosphere by some societies 
might tend to stifle the expression of certain groups on campus; see comment by the JCHR, Counter Extremism - 
Second Report of Session 2016-17 HL Paper 39, HC 105, [60]. 
41 See n 149 below. 
42
 Eg a number of Islamic preachers have been banned by the University of East London (UEL): Murtaza Khan 
and Uthman Lateef were due to speak at a dinner predicted to be gender-segregated held in the University by the 
Islamic society, but were barred due to their views on homosexuality which had included stating that 
homosexuality should be punished by death (‘Islamist extremists blocked at East London University’ Peter 
Tatchell Foundation, 29.4.14, at http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/islamist-extremists-blocked-at-east-
london-university/, accessed 15.4.18); Imran ibn Mansur had also been due to speak at a gender-segregated UEL 
Islamic Society event, but was barred by the University. Mansur has stated that homosexuality is ‘obscene, filthy, 
shameless’ (see D. Churchill, ‘London university bans preacher who calls homosexuality a “filthy” disease’ 
Evening Standard, 24.11.14). 
43
 E.g. a Report published by the University of Westminster Student Union LGBT Society in 2014 investigated 
how safe LGBT students feel on campus after gay and transgender student communities on campus were reported 
to ‘feel unsafe’ due to the activities of some in the Islamic society: L. Sherriff, ‘Extremist Students Consistently 
Given A Platform At Westminster’, while “Useless” SU Does Nothing’ Huffington Post, 27.2.15: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/02/27/extremist-students-consis_n_6767440.html (accessed 15.4.18). See 
also P Walker ‘Emwazi’s University more scared of being Islamophobic than homophobic’ the Guardian 2.3.15.  
44
 See ‘Gender segregation: The truth about Muslim women “forced” to sit away from men’ The Telegraph, 
19.1.16. 
45
 JCHR, Counter Extremism - Second Report of Session 2016-17 (HL Paper 39, HC 105), [61]. 
46
 ‘Gender Segregation at Events and Meetings: guidance for universities and Students’ Unions’, 17.7.14: 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/gender-segregation-events-and-meetings-
guidance-universities-and-students, (accessed 15.4.18). 
47
 Ibid: gender segregation is permissible during religious worship because it is not covered by equality law, but 
otherwise, equality law applies to events and the courts are likely to consider any gender segregation to be 
discriminatory on grounds of gender, and so unlawful. (21.7.14). Universities UK has updated its guidance, 
‘External speakers in higher education institutions’ (2013), to take account of the EHRC’s advice, p27, Case study 
2. 
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include condoning gender discrimination,48  and also that ‘If the event’s organisers or the 
external speaker place pressure on any woman to sit separately from men (or vice versa) this 
would also amount to unlawful harassment’.49  
 
It can therefore be concluded that use of gender-segregated seating — even where claimed by 
the organisers to be voluntary — is prima facie unlawful. If, for example, a female student was 
in effect required to sit at the back in a gender-segregated lecture hall, whether or not she 
therefore found it difficult to participate in any debate, or found her questions ignored,50 the 
university would have breached the equality duty, and the student could also have a claim 
against the university under section 7 HRA, relying on Article 10 read with 14, or alone, given 
its duty in relation to organising an event on its premises. It has been accepted under Article 
14 at Strasbourg that especially weighty reasons must be advanced, not including a mere appeal 
to tradition,51 justifying measures creating differentiation if certain grounds of discrimination 
are at stake, including sexual orientation and gender.52 So speakers expecting or requesting to 
speak to a gender-segregated audience might withdraw, or invitations to them might be 
rescinded. This duty may be linked to the statutory Prevent duty since there may be a 
correlation between the type of speaker presenting a high risk, and the likelihood that gender-
segregated seating would be put in place when he was to speak.53  
Equality duties of universities can therefore lead to the placing of curbs on speaking events, 
which may, however, be justifiable as reflecting the competing right to non-discrimination. 
Positive obligations under the duties could, consistently with Article 14, include an obligation 
imposed on the institution to disallow discrimination against or harassment of certain minority 
groups or women on campus that could be fostered as a result of speaking events, or due to the 
posting of discriminatory material relating to such events in universities54 on or off-line. Thus 
duties to further equality could lead to the cancellation of such events, which could potentially 
be justified under Article 10(2), as discussed in Part G below. 
 
Reflecting these provisions in section 43 Codes of Practice 
 
                                                 
48
 Ibid, 6. 
49
 Ibid, 5. 
50
 For discriminatory treatment of female students attending an Islamic Society seminar at Queen Mary University 
see C Chumley The Washington Times 16.12.13. 
51
 Vrountou v Cyprus App No 33631/06, judgment of 13 October 2015, [75]. 
52
 Konstantin Markin v Russia (2013) 56 EHRR 8. 
53
 For example ‘Islam vs Atheism’ on 9.3.13 at UCL was organised by a Salafist group with reported links to 
extremism termed ‘the Islamic Education and Research Academy’ (IERA); gender segregation was enforced, 
reportedly using intimidatory tactics by allocating  women seats at the back corner of the auditorium 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/ucl-bans-islamic-group-over-segregation, accessed 15.4.18). 
IERA was then banned from campus by UCL. The University of Leicester launched an investigation into gender 
segregation in May 2013 (see M. Williams, ‘Inquiry launched after Islamic group holds segregated lecture’ the 
Guardian, 15.4.13) at a public lecture featuring guest speaker Hamza Tzortzi, hosted by its student Islamic society. 
See further: R. Sutton, ‘Is segregation on campuses becoming the norm?’ The Commentator18.3.13:    
http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2956/is_segregation_on_campuses_becoming_the_norm (accessed 
15.4.18); C Bennett ‘Segregation by gender has no place in our public realm’, the Guardian 15.12.13. 
54
 Action taken in respect of such material could accord with the principles underlying the decision in Vejdeland 
and Others v Sweden (2014) 58 EHRR 15. A conviction for distributing leaflets at an upper secondary school that 
claimed homosexuality was a ‘deviant sexual proclivity’ and ‘morally destructive’ was held not to violate Article 
10.  
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Reflecting the existing criminal offences discussed, but going beyond them, most universities 
have specified in their Codes reflecting section 43 Education (No 2) Act 1986 that speaking 
events may be cancelled or minimised if one or more of the offences considered above might 
be committed, or if support for a proscribed organisation was likely to be expressed. 55 
Reflecting the Equality duty, the Codes may also refer to bans if the event is likely to ‘give rise 
to an environment within which people will experience, or could reasonably fear, harassment 
or intimidation, particularly because of their ethnicity, race, nationality, religion or belief, 
sexual orientation’.56 Such terminology could cover posters, online advertising or reporting on 
a speaking event reaching students or staff not present at the event itself. The Codes thus draw 
the offences and the Equality duty to the attention of organizers of public meetings and 
assemblies indoors and outdoors in universities.57 
In accordance with the section 43 Codes, for example, a speaker associated with a far-right 
group could be barred from speaking in a university if it appeared that Muslims might have 
been attacked in the speech, creating potential liability under the provisions against stirring up 
hatred on grounds of religion, but it would be much more probable that religiously aggravated 
public order grounds under sections 4A or 5 POA, or the doctrine of breach of the peace, would 
be referred to.58 Those sections, or, conceivably, the provisions against incitement on grounds 
of sexual orientation, could also be referred to in order to bar ‘extremist’ speakers if attacks on 
homosexuals were anticipated.59  
Certain section 43 Codes appear to be having some inhibiting effect on expression on campus. 
They were therefore quite heavily criticised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 201860 
on the basis of their very varying requirements, the inhibiting impact on free expression of the 
provisions of a number of the Codes, the excessive burdens some of them placed on organisers 
of speaking events, and their imprecise references to the offences discussed here. In particular, 
                                                 
55
 For example, the University of Western England Code of Practice, pursuant to the Education (No 2) Act 1986 
(Part IV, s43), [6] (iii) and (v).  
56
 Ibid, at [4]. A number of s43 Codes include that terminology. 
57
 The Code of Practice promulgated under s43 by the University of Cambridge, for example, refers to a number 
of the offences considered here, at [7], as does the Freedom of Expression Protocol of the University of Leeds 
(revised February 2016), [5]. 
58
 See thus Oxford Union’s cancellation of its speaking invitation to English Defence League founder Tommy 
Robinson: K. Rawlinson, ’EDL leader’s Oxford Union appearance cancelled’ BBC News, 10 March 2013, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24037103 (accessed 15.4.18). The same reportedly occurred at Durham and 
Edinburgh universities in 2015: S Hopkins Huffington Post 22.10.15. See also n 175 below and associated text. 
59
 Under POA, s29AB (inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008). The provisions could 
cover, for example, the Islamist preacher, Abu Usamah at-Thahabi who was invited to Reading University in 
2013 to speak to the Islamic society; he had previously argued that homosexuals should be killed: P. Tatchell, 
‘Reading University colludes with Far-Right Extremist Muslim society’ Huffington Post, 1 March 2013, at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/peter-g-tatchell/reading-university-colludes-muslim-
extremism_b_2790556.html (accessed 15.4.18). Similarly, on 11.6.12 the Islamic Society at York University 
hosted a preacher, Yusuf Chambers, from ‘the Islamic Education and Research Academy’ who has expressed 
the desire that homosexuals be killed (Student Rights, 12.6.12), 58.  See further  
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Extreme-Speakers-and-Events-in-the-2016-17-
Academic-Year-Final.pdf. The Henry Jackson Society  also reported in 2016 that 30 events featuring ‘extremist’ 
speakers, some with a history of holding extreme homophobic views, who denigrated homosexuality at the 
events, occurred in London universities, see: 
http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2373/extreme_or_intolerant_speakers_on_london_campuses_between_s
eptember_2015_and_january_2016. There has, however, only been one successful prosecution: in R v Ihjaz Ali, 
Kabir Ahmed and Razwan Javed (10.2.12) three Muslim men from Derby were convicted of inciting hatred on 
the grounds of sexual orientation after they distributed leaflets calling for gay people to be killed (reported at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-v-ali-javed-and-ahmed/, accessed 15.4.18).  
60
 See n 8, at [87]-[91].  
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the Committee found that the bureaucracy associated with the Codes tended to have an 
inhibiting impact on student organisers of speaking events.61 The regulation of the university 
sector by the Office for Students may mean therefore, as part of its remit to protect free speech, 
that further guidance as to the content of the Codes will be issued.  
 
C. The aims underlying University Prevent duties: addressing links to 
violent extremism? 
 
The shift in the Prevent strategy to cover non-violent extremism 
 
The concerns underlying the Part 5 provisions had previously been expressed in non-statutory 
form, mainly via the Prevent strategy, which applied to educational establishments, but no 
specific legal duties were placed on them.62 Located within the broader counter terrorism 
CONTEST strategy63 of the Blair Government, which aimed to reduce the risk of exposure to 
international terrorism, Prevent sought to tackle the radicalization of persons by:  
deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become  
terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalizing  
others can operate.   
Not long after the July 2005 London bombings there were reports that governmental concerns 
had been expressed as to the threat of violent radicalisation on UK campuses. 64  Shortly 
afterwards, the legal incarnation of the deterrent strategy was unveiled as Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 which, as was seen above, criminalises the indirect encouragement of 
terrorism (section 1) and the dissemination of such encouragement electronically or by other 
means (sections 2 and 3). Subsequent iterations of Prevent65 later highlighted the threat of 
violent extremism in educational establishments and focused on campuses in particular as 
centres of such radicalization.66 The view had previously been expressed that there was a 
                                                 
61 Ibid, at [87]: ‘some [Codes] are unclear, difficult to navigate, or impose bureaucratic hurdles which could deter 
students from holding events and inviting external speakers’. 
62
 See the Guidance from the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Promoting Good Campus 
Relations (London, 2008). 
63 Alongside Prevent, the other strands of the CONTEST policy comprise Pursue (gathering intelligence to 
understand the terrorist threat, detecting and disrupting terrorist networks, working with partners abroad); Protect 
(improving border security, reducing vulnerability of key sites such as utilities and transport) and Prepare 
(focusing on the capacity to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks and the continuous testing and 
evaluation of preparedness): Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (2006) Cm 
6888 pp.1-2. The Prevent element also stressed the importance of ‘tackling disadvantage and supporting reform 
by addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalization, such inequalities 
and discrimination.’ See ibid at para.62.   
64
 See eg P. Curtis, ‘Minister Urges Action on Campus Extremism’ the Guardian, 20 July 2005 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/jul/20/highereducation.uk (accessed 15.4.18).  
65
 ‘The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England; stopping people becoming or supporting 
terrorists and violent extremists’ (2008) at https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/45/the-
prevent-strategy-a-guide-for-local-partners-in-england-stopping-people-becoming-or-supporting-terrorists-and-
violent-extremists (accessed 15.4.18). 
66
 The 2011 Prevent Strategy review stated ‘we believe there is unambiguous evidence to indicate that some 
extremist organisations, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir, target specific universities and colleges...with the objective of 
radicalising and recruiting students’ (Cm 8092 June 2011 at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011 (accessed 15.4.18)). 
10 
 
likelihood that encountering radical expression on campus might lead to radicalization of 
students, and then to acts of terrorism,67 although the notion of such a linear pathway has since 
been doubted, as discussed below.  
A significant extension in Prevent from a focus upon supporting terrorism and violent 
extremism to embracing ‘non-violent extremism’ occurred during the Coalition Government 
and Theresa May’s tenure of office as Home Secretary. This too appears to rest upon a linear 
understanding of pathways into terrorist activity. ‘Non-violent extremism’ was considered to 
be responsible for the creation of an environment that helped popularize views which could 
then be exploited by terrorists. As the amended 2011 version of Prevent put it:  
 We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But 
preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are 
also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to stop people 
moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.68 
 
The term ‘extremism’ was defined in 2015 to include the ‘vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.’69 Theresa May expressed the policy shift 
in the following terms: 
 
 The starting point of the new strategy is the emphatic rejection of the misconception  
that, in a liberal democracy like Britain, ‘anything goes’- the belief that living in a 
society like ours means that there aren’t any fundamental rules or norms. Instead the 
foundation of our new strategy is the proud promotion of British values. 70  
The Government’s amended policy now points to the application of the Prevent strand of 
CONTEST in instances that include the peaceful advocacy of whatever is entailed in the 
expression of ‘non-violent extremism’ or ‘anti-British values.’ The imprecision of the 
terminology has been criticised inter alia by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights.71  
 
‘Extremist’ speakers in Universities  
 
The Guidance to universities accompanying section 26 CTSA, discussed below in Part D, 
reflected that shift in strategy. It was introduced partly to answer to concerns raised, especially 
                                                 
67
 See for an example of the now largely discredited linear pathways view, A. Glees and C. Pope, ‘When students 
turn to terror’ (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2005). See also Radical Islam on UK Campuses (London Centre for 
Social Cohesion, 2010) pp v-vi. 
68
 Prevent Strategy (2011) Cm 8092 para.3.10. 
69
 Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales, para.7: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_
Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf (accessed 15.4.18). 
70
 ‘A Stronger Britain, Built On Our Values’ March 23, 2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-
stronger-britain-built-on-our-values (accessed 15.4.18).  
71
 JCHR 2nd Report Counter- Extremism (2016-17) HL Paper 39, HC 105, [108].  
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in 2011,72 2012,73 and 201474 that certain University Islamic societies (ISOCs) had contributed 
to the radicalisation of students, mainly by inviting visiting speakers deemed extremist. 
Clearly, the Part 5 provisions could be, and in other contexts have been, deployed against any 
‘extremist’ speakers, including members or supporters of far-right groups.75 However, such 
far-right speakers are rarely invited to speak at universities due to no-platforming or ‘safe 
space’ policies of the NUS, individual student unions and societies.76 If they are invited they 
tend to attract protests, usually leading them to withdraw or be barred on public order 
grounds.77 The Part 5 provisions could also be deployed against ‘extremist’ speakers from any 
religious background, but it has been claimed that controversial non-Islamic speakers are also 
likely to be barred from speaking due to such student policies.78 These twin tendencies may 
partly explain why the aims as stated by government representatives, and the impact of Prevent 
on-campus in practice, indicate a focus mainly on Islamic speakers and societies.79   
 
Student vulnerability, student societies, external speakers and radicalisation 
  
The concern as to radicalisation in universities was documented in the Report ‘Roots of violent 
radicalisation’ from the Home Affairs Committee in 2012. 80  A linear association was 
contemplated between holding a position in an ISOC and later engagement in terrorist activity: 
a number of students who were senior members of Islamic societies have gone on to mount 
                                                 
72
 See ‘Freedom of Speech on Campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities’, a Report published by 
Universities UK, the umbrella group for Vice-Chancellors (2011), at  www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-
and.../2011/freedom-of-speech-on-campus.pdf (accessed 15.4.18). The report was drawn up following the 
conviction of former UCL student Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, for attempting to blow up a passenger plane over 
Detroit. 
73
 See n 81 and associated text. 
74
 According to the government’s Extremism Analysis Unit ‘at least 70 events featuring speakers known to the 
government for promoting rhetoric that aimed to “undermine core British values” such as democracy, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and respect and tolerance for other faiths and belief systems were held on University 
campuses in 2014’; it named four London universities - Queen Mary, King’s College, SOAS and Kingston 
University - as those which had hosted the greatest number of such events; see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pms-extremism-taskforce-tackling-extremism-in-universities-and-
colleges-top-of-the-agenda (accessed 15.4.18). 
75
 Home Office, ‘Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme’, April 2015 to March 
2016, 9.11.17. In 2015/16, of the 7,631 individuals referred, 4,997 (65%) were referred for concerns related to 
Islamist extremism and 759 (10%) were referred for concerns related to right wing extremism. Of the 1,072 
individuals discussed at a Channel panel, 189 were referred for concerns related to extreme right-wing extremism 
(18%) and this proportion increased for the 381 individuals who received Channel support (99; 26 %). The 
majority of referrals came from the education sector.  
76
 See further Section E below, in particular n 151 and associated text. 
77
 For example, Durham Union Society, a debating society separate from Durham SU, invited two elected 
members of the British National Party (BNP) to a debate on multiculturalism in February 2010, but it was 
cancelled after threats of mass protests (8.2.10 https://issuu.com/palatinate/docs/715, accessed 15.4.18). Similarly, 
at the University of Bath in 2007 concerns over NUS and UAF protests on campus led to BNP leader Nick 
Griffin’s invitation to the university being declined (http://lancasteruaf.blogspot.co.uk/2007/05/bnp-audience-
outnumbered-by-protestors.html, accessed 15.4.18). 
78
 See L Kollrin The Jewish Chronicle, 22.3.17 for an accusation that Israeli speakers were regularly blocked and 
pro-Palestinian speakers permitted to address students at King’s College London. See further below, n 147 and n 
160. 
79
 The previous Guidance was focused solely on Islamic violent extremism: Promoting Good Campus Relations: 
Working with Staff and Students to build Community Cohesion and Tackle Violent Extremism in the name of Islam 
in universities and Colleges (Department for Education and Skills, 2006). 
80
 Nineteenth Report of Session (2010-12) HC 1446. 
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terror attacks. The 2012 Report cited a range of examples.81 The Committee also considered 
some evidence of the promotion of radicalisation by the Federation of Student Islamic Societies 
(FOSIS), the umbrella organisation to which the vast majority of university Islamic societies 
are affiliated, partly on the basis that it was founded in 1963 by a number of activists from the 
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami movements,82 although that notion has been 
challenged.83 
The 2012 Report further highlighted the university connection in finding that 30 per cent of 
those involved in terrorist plots were graduates,84 but it was noted that the 2011 Prevent Review 
had not found that terrorists themselves were active recruiters in universities, but rather that 
the Government’s concern related to those ‘who are speaking regularly against core UK values 
and whose ideology incidentally is also shared by terrorist organisations’ and the fact that this 
appeared to be going unchallenged. 85  It was also suggested to the Committee that some 
students might be vulnerable to radicalisation at university since: ‘universities were places of 
vulnerability…That makes it easy for extremist groups to pick them up’.86 On similar lines, the 
government linked the concerns underlying Part 5 not only to protecting the public, but also to 
the welfare of students: as part of the Prevent strategy it cited the duty of care owed by 
universities to students and staff to safeguard them from the effects of radicalization,87 and that 
point was reiterated in 2018 to the JCHR.88 
Clearly, the fact that about one third of persons convicted of terrorist offences in the UK had 
attended university does not in itself demonstrate that encountering radical materials or 
speakers at university, whether via engagement with ISOC activities or otherwise, has played 
                                                 
81
 Examples it put forward (at [26]) included: Kafeel Ahmed, (attempted Glasgow airport suicide attack) on the 
executive of Queen’s University Belfast ISOC; Waseem Mughal, (convicted of inciting murder for terrorist 
purposes) ran the University of Leicester ISOC website; Yassin Nassari, (convicted of possession for terrorist 
purposes)  was President of the University of Westminster Harrow campus ISOC; Waheed Zaman (convicted for 
his role in the transatlantic liquid bomb plot) was formerly the President of London Metropolitan University ISOC; 
Abdulmutallab, (the attempted bomber of Flight 253 over Detroit in 2009), was the President of UCL ISOC.  
82
 Ibid; see Q252 et seq from Michael Ellis, referring to an overview from Lord Carlile, one of the previous 
independent reviewers of terrorism legislation.    
83
 On the basis that instead it came to their attention after being founded to cater for the pastoral needs of 
international students: see T. Choudhury, ‘Campaigning on Campus: counterterrorism legislation and student 
Islamic Societies’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2016, Taylor and Francis online). See also S. Nabi, 
‘Federation of Student Islamic Societies, (FOSIS) UK’ in F. Peter and R. Ortega (eds), Islamic Movements in 
Europe (London: IB Tauris, 2014). 
84
 At [34]. Examples given included: Islamic State militant Mohammed Emwazi a graduate of Westminster 
University;. Omar Sharif, a suicide bomber in Tel Aviv in 2003, allegedly radicalized during his first year at 
King’s College London after attending Hizb-ut-Tahrir meetings on campus; Anthony Garcia, convicted for his 
role in the 2004 ‘fertiliser’ bomb plot, attended religious talks in the late 1990s at the University of East London 
ISOC; and Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, convicted for his role in Dhiren Barot’s 2004 ‘dirty bomb’ plot, was 
studying at Brunel University and met Barot in the University’s prayer room. 
85
 This point was made by the Director General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Charles Farr, 
ibid, [31]. For the 2011 review, see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/review-of-the-existing-counter-
radicalisation-strategy-known-as-prevent (accessed 15.4.18). 
86
 Evidence from Professor Neumann, who had undertaken a study in 2007 for the European Commission: ibid 
[31]. She further found: ‘people of a certain age, often away from home for the first time, [may] feel quite lost 
and experience…a crisis of identity’. 
87
 HM Government Prevent Strategy, Cm 8092 (2011), 72. See also Home Affairs Select Committee 
‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point’ 2 August 2016, [55]: ‘We have heard calls 
for Prevent to be brought to an end (although notably not from Inspire or the families of those who had travelled 
to join Daesh)’. 
88
 See n 8, at [74]. 
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any part in involvement in terrorism.89 A comprehensive study of Islamic terrorism in the UK 
in 2017 found that there appears to be ‘little correlation between involvement in terrorism and 
educational achievement’.90 A correlation was, however, found between exposure to extremist 
material, and engagement in terrorist related activity.91 It was also found: ‘Institutions and 
sectors remain significant, with the education sector, local authorities and prisons a feature in 
half of offences’.92 Higher education was thus identified as an ‘at-risk’ sector which should be 
supported in resisting possibilities of radicalisation and the inspiration of terrorist activity. A 
further Report into students and radicalisation in 2017 found that universities could provide 
social spaces in which extremists affiliated to or sympathetic to groups such as ISIS could seek 
to radicalise Muslim students, and that real-world contacts in general could be as important as 
online ones in terms of contributing to radicalisation.93 That was the basis on which the JCHR 
accepted in 2018 that the Prevent strategy is clearly needed on campus, accepting the evidence 
of a number of witnesses, including the Minister for Security, who told the JCHR: We know 
that there are and have been terrorist radicalisers and recruiters, and terrorists active on campus, 
who have recruited young men and women into terrorism. We know that from some 
convictions’.94  
While the notion therefore of a simplistic linear pathway between exposure to extreme right-
wing speakers or radical preachers at university, leading to radicalisation, and then engagement 
in terrorist activity, should be rejected, identification of universities as one among a number of 
at-risk sectors makes a case for seeking resilience against radicalisation within them, partly for 
the sake of students who might be at risk, and their families. But the connection between Part 
5 and building such resilience is not fully clear. Given the professed aims of Part 5, the lack of 
establishment of a clear causal link between exposure to radical speakers’ ‘extremist’ speech 
at university, and later terrorist-related activity, constitutes a weakness of the speech-related 
strategy underlying the statutory Prevent duty in universities. Inevitably, the precise causal 
relation between exposure to radical preachers and radical materials at university and later 
involvement in terrorism would always be very hard, if not almost impossible, to establish,95 
as the Home Office Select Committee recently acknowledged.96 While some impact would be 
                                                 
89
 2012 Report, n 80, [38]. 
90
 H. Stuart, ‘Key findings and analysis’ in ‘Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK 
(1998-2015)’ The Henry Jackson Society (2017), 2. (It may be noted that funding sources for HJS remain unclear 
but critics have accused it of pursuing an anti-Muslim, anti-free speech agenda, see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/dec/30/rightwing-thinktank-pulls-funds-commons-groups-
disclosure-rules (accessed 15 April 2018)). 
91
 ‘Offenders commonly consumed extremist and/or instructional material prior to, or as part of, their offending’ 
ibid, 14. 
92
 Ibid, 20.  
93
 E. Webb, ‘Spotting the Signs: Identifying Vulnerability to Radicalisation Among Students’ The Henry Jackson 
Society (2017). 
94
 JCHR Report, n 8 above, at [73].  
95
 See Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, ‘Addressing Islamic Extremism’ Postnote No 526 Houses 
of Parliament (May 2016);. The lack of a specific common profile of terrorists was highlighted by R. Pantucci et 
al, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism Literature Review’, RUSI, 16 December 2015, 5, available at: 
https://rusi.org/publication/occasionalpapers/lone-actor-terrorism-literature-review (last accessed 15 April 2018); 
P. Gill et al, ‘Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists’, 
(2014) 59(2) Journal of Forensic Sciences 425, 434. 
96
 ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point’ Eighth Report of Session 2016-17 HC 
135 ‘There is no evidence that shows a single path or one single event which draws a young person to the 
scourge of extremism: every case is different. Identifying people at risk of being radicalized and then attracted 
to extremist behaviour is very challenging’, at [18]: 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf (accessed 15.4.18).   
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expected to be the case,97 given the persuasive function of expression, the question, which is 
addressed below, is whether it justifies the potentially far-reaching impact on free expression 
posed by section 26 CTSA with its accompanying Guidance, particularly when account is taken 
of the range of existing, overlapping provisions.  
 
D. Over-breadth of the expression-related Prevent duties of 
universities? 
 
Speech advocating violence or non-violent extremism 
Among international human rights’ bodies it has long been acknowledged that the fight against 
terrorism must be cabined within the rule of law and established human rights norms. The 
Special Rapporteur’s 2016 Report to the Human Rights Council reiterates these important 
precepts: ‘…simply holding peacefully views that are considered ‘extreme’ under any 
definition should never be criminalized, unless they are associated with violence or criminal 
activity. The peaceful pursuance of a political, or any other agenda — even where that agenda 
is different from the objectives of the government and considered to be ‘extreme’ — must be 
protected. Governments should counter ideas they disagree with, but should not seek to prevent 
non-violent ideas and opinions from being discussed’.98 At the same time, the Report also 
refers to ‘a dangerous grey zone of expression that lies somewhere between peaceful 
expression and incitement…that needs to be addressed.’99 The statutory provisions under Part 
5 as applied on campus focus on that zone to address the risk of students being drawn into 
terrorism, but, as discussed below, they could, as reflected in the accompanying Guidance, also 
catch some expressions of non-violent extremism. 100  Section 26 CTSA provides that a 
specified authority must, when exercising its functions,101 have ‘due regard’ to the need ‘to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (the ‘Prevent’ duty). As applied in universities 
section 26 is aimed in part at addressing the concern that universities have disregarded the risk 
that students might be radicalized and drawn towards terrorism via extremist expression. The 
government has stated that the Prevent duty is to be strengthened, as part of the government’s 
wider reworking of its Contest counter-terrorism strategy, so any problematic aspects of the 
Prevent duty as applied on campus may be exacerbated in future.102 The announcement of a 
                                                 
97
 See Radicalisation on British University Campuses (London: Quilliam, 2010). 
98
 Human Rights Council, February 2016, A/HRC/31/65 at [38], Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms while countering terrorism (2016). See also Open Society 
Justice Initiative, ‘Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education’, at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/erodingtrust-uk-s-prevent-counter-extremism-strategy-health-
and-education (October 2016). 
99
 Ibid, at [39]. 
100
 See n 104. 
101
 Such an authority is one listed in Schedule 6 CTSA. Under s 26(3) the duty does not apply to certain functions 
of the authority. 
102
 The Home Office confirmed in 2016 (see A. Travis, ‘Prevent strategy to be ramped up despite “big brother” 
concerns’ the Guardian, 11.11.16) that a secret Whitehall internal review of Prevent had been ordered earlier in 
2016 by Theresa May when she was Home Secretary. It concluded that the programme ‘should be strengthened, 
not undermined’ and put forward 12 suggestions (as yet unpublished) as to how to reinforce it. After the terrorist 
attacks in Westminster on 22.3.17, Manchester on 22.5.17 and London on 3.6.17, Theresa May as PM reaffirmed 
that the expected review would include ‘a major expansion of the Prevent anti-radicalisation programme’: A. 
Travis, the Guardian, 23.3.17. After the terrorist attack in Manchester on 22 May 2017 the (then) Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, reiterated this commitment to strengthening Prevent: ‘Government’s anti-terror Prevent programme 
must be strengthened after Manchester attack, says former terror watchdog’ J. Maidment, The Telegraph, 24.5.17.    
15 
 
Commission for Countering Extremism could widen the focus of government strategy to the 
mere holding of views considered to be ‘anti-British’, but until it is known what 
recommendations the Commission makes to Government, it is unclear how the legal 
environment may be affected.103  
Placement of aspects of Prevent on a statutory basis under Part 5 marks a new emphasis in 
counter-terrorist law and policy, but the duties under Part 5 do not on their face place a legal 
obligation to combat ‘extremist’ speech on the authorities covered, but that term is central to 
the accompanying Guidance.104  The Guidance indicates that the aims underlying Part 5 go 
beyond seeking to curb violent extremism, and could cover manifestations of non-violent 
extremism,105 despite a troubling lack of clarity as to the meaning of the concept. The aim 
underlying section 26, impliedly allowing the curbing of expression in universities, is to disrupt 
pathways into terrorism via radicalization; so the provisions strongly contrast with the aims 
behind the special terrorism offences under the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, as amended, 
which are to punish acts of terrorism and to allow intervention at a very early stage in terrorist 
plots and in preparing terrorist acts (‘precursor’ offences).106 Part 5 also contrasts with liberty-
invading non-trial-based measures, in particular TPIMs,107 since such measures are aimed at 
persons who are likely (on the balance of probabilities)108 to engage in forms of terrorist-related 
activity (TRA), while Part 5 is aimed at seeking to prevent persons from ever engaging in such 
activity. 109  It represents an attempt to allow intervention in an assumed process of 
radicalization which — it also presumes — might eventually lead to engagement in TRA.  
The Prevent Guidance to universities 
The opaque and very general provision of section 26 is given a degree of form by the Guidance 
to universities that the Secretary of State has issued under section 29(1),110  covering the 
                                                 
103
 See https://w.w.w.gov.uk/government/organisations/commission-for-countering-extremism (accessed 
15.4.18). The Counter-Extremism Commissioner is tasked with providing a comprehensive study of the ‘scale, 
influence and reach of extremism within Britain…and look(ing) at the effectiveness of counter-extremism 
measures and policies…’. The appointee, Sara Khan, is a longstanding supporter of a version of Islam that is 
reconcilable with democratic values and of the Prevent strategy. Her appointment was greeted with concern by 
some, see: ‘new counter-terrorism tsar faces calls to quit’ 25.1.18 at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
42807560 (accessed 25.3.18); J Grierson, ‘Choice of new UK anti-extremism chief criticised as “alarming’’’, the 
Guardian 25.1.18. 
104
 s 29 CTSA provides that the Secretary of State can issue guidance to specified authorities. The ‘Revised 
Prevent Duty Guidance’, 16.7.15 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance, accessed 
15.4.18), defines extremism as: ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. [It includes] 
calls for the death of members of our armed forces’ ([7]). It also states: ‘being drawn into terrorism includes not 
just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism’ 
([64]). 
105
 Ibid. Article 19, Amnesty International and 56 organizations, found in a joint statement that Initiatives to 
‘counter and prevent violent extremism’ raise serious human rights concerns, since the term is undefined, 
4.3.16, (Index: IOR 40/3417/2016): https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/3417/2016/en/, accessed 
15.4.18. 
106
 See in particular sections 1 (encouragement of terrorism), and 5 (conduct in preparation for terrorism).  
107
 Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, as amended by CTSA, Part 2. 
108
 CTSA s20(1) amending TPIMA, s3(1)). 
109
 See further on this point in relation to Prevent generally, C. Walker and J. Rehman, ‘“Prevent” responses to 
jihadi extremism’ in V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor, and K. Roach, (eds) Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy (CUP, 
2012), esp 257-60. 
110
 ‘Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education Institutions’ 16 July 2015 (n 104).    
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possibility of restricting a range of forms of expression, including that of visiting speakers.111 
In relation to campus speaking events (as distinct from teaching) the section 26 Guidance 
indicates that if the anticipated expression does not appear to be likely to infringe existing 
criminal provisions the institution still has to take account of the duty, requiring an incursion 
into expression going beyond such provisions.112 Under the Guidance universities must have 
policies in place relating to the management of events and use of premises that clearly state 
what is required in order for a speaking event to take place. Since the section 43 Codes already 
cover such events, a number of universities have absorbed the Prevent duty into the Codes. The 
Guidance applies to events on campus, but also to those off-campus but associated with the 
university.113 So a university is also responsible for relevant decisions of the student union or 
a student society in relation to speaking events.114 The duty could also apply, although this is 
not expressly specified in the Guidance, to a range of media associated with a speaking event 
in a university, such as pamphlets, use of social media (for example, to ‘live tweet’ a speech),115 
to publicise an event, as well as the spoken word.  
The Secretary of State was required to appoint an ‘appropriate body to monitor compliance 
with the Prevent duty’116 and HEFCE was given that responsibility until it was abolished in 
2018.117 In 2017 it found that the vast majority of universities had responded positively and 
effectively to HEFCE’s monitoring role and the statutory duty.118 But if the Secretary of State 
was satisfied that a university has not discharged the section 26 duty she could give it directions 
to enforce the performance of the duty (under section 30). In publicly-funded FEIs governance 
would be reviewed, and ultimately dissolution of the institution could occur.119 
Vetting external speakers under the Guidance 
The vetting of external speakers by universities under the section 26(1) duty as fleshed out in 
the Guidance120 clearly has some impact on freedom of expression (protected inter alia under 
                                                 
111
 Ibid, [7]; for Further Education Institutions (n 104), [5]. 
112
 Ibid, at [7], [10], [11]. 
113
 [12] of the Guidance (n 104): ‘a mechanism [should be] in place for assessing the risks associated with any 
events which are RHEB [Relevant Higher Education Bodies] affiliated, funded or branded but which take place 
off-campus’. 
114
 Ibid, [6] and [7]. 
115
 These forms of expression could fall within the general wording of [5], ibid. 
116
 Ibid, at [31]. 
117
 The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills delegated to HEFCE responsibility for monitoring 
compliance of the Prevent duty for relevant English higher education providers which came into effect on 21.8.15. 
In September 2016 HEFCE published an ‘Updated framework for the monitoring of the Prevent duty in higher 
education in England’ (HEFCE 2016/24). HEFCE was abolished on 1.4.18 under s81 Higher Education and 
Research Act 2017 and replaced by the Office for Students (n 9) set up under Part 1 of the 2017 Act which took 
over its Prevent duty. In Wales, the Prevent duty is at present monitored by the Higher Education Funding Council 
for Wales (HEFCW). 
118
 Institutions put their policies in place in 2016 and submitted their ‘Prevent action plans’ to HEFCE in January 
and April 2016, providing self-assessments of their level of preparedness to comply with their new duties. HEFCE 
found that the response to HEFCE’s monitoring role had been positive as risk-based and proportionate (80% of 
respondents took that view): ‘Evaluation of monitoring of the Prevent duty in higher education in England’, 
HEFCE, 1.8.17 (Ref. 2017/12), at [37]. See also ‘Implementation of the Prevent duty in the Higher Education 
sector in England: 2015-16’ (2017/01), and n 133.  
119
 HMG ‘Prevent Guidance for FEIs in England and Wales’ (2015), [30]. In respect of non-publicly-funded 
institutions their contract could be terminated by the Skills Funding Agency.  
120
 In HEIs and FEIs the Guidance promulgated makes it clear that the duty under s26 applies to the expression 
of visiting speakers, students or staff. See: ibid, [5-9]; ‘Guidance for HEIs’, [7-11]. 
17 
 
section 31 CTSA, as discussed below), even though it does not necessarily amount to a bar on 
speech, since it could have an inhibitory impact on inviting speakers, and could operate as a 
precursor to a bar. After amendment to the Guidance, universities do not need to require the 
text of a speech by an external speaker in advance,121 but do need to ensure in relation to ‘at 
risk’ speakers that a speaker opposed to their views also speaks at the same event, if so doing 
could fully mitigate the risk created.122 So when universities are deciding whether to host a 
speaker they should pay particular attention to the views being ‘expressed, or likely to be’, by 
considering whether they ‘constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or 
are shared by terrorist groups’.123 Applauding the actions of terrorist groups or supporting 
terrorism would amount to the expression of violent extremism capable of creating the risk in 
question, and so would be covered by both the Guidance and section 26.  
Taken at face value, however, the Guidance also covers non-violent extremism, and therefore 
could incentivise the curbing or suppression of forms of political expression critical of 
mainstream orthodoxies and ‘British values’. If the speaker appears to present a risk that such 
views may be expressed, the institution, under the Guidance, must cancel the event unless it is 
‘entirely convinced that it can mitigate fully the risk without cancellation’.124 One very literal 
interpretation of the Guidance could be that it requires the institution to make a prediction over 
an unspecified time-frame about the future conduct of those attending the meeting in order to 
be satisfied that the risk that someone at a later point in their life might be drawn into terrorism 
had been entirely eliminated. The Guidance could appear to require universities on an event-
by-event basis to make judgments about the persuasive qualities of the opposing speakers, a 
task that would necessitate a close understanding of how audience members are likely to 
evaluate the respective contributions of speakers. Differences in eloquence or even in a 
predicted non-rational, highly individual emotional connection between the original speaker 
and some members of the audience, could point towards a likelihood of failure to comply with 
the Guidance. The phrasing of the Guidance is therefore capable of steering a cautious 
university towards the risk-averse conclusion that if the sympathies of the majority of the 
audience were more likely to be with the original speaker, the risk might be deemed to be 
unable to be mitigated. 
However, criticizing mainstream orthodoxies would amount to non-violent extremism which 
would not without more be covered by section 26; further, expressing views shared by terrorist 
groups could also count as non-violent extremism covered by section 26 only if it is apparent 
that the holding of the view is causally linked to a risk of being drawn into terrorism. That 
causal link could arise if the views expressed are intended to create isolationism and division, 
meaning that listeners might be persuaded that the use of democratic means to address 
grievances should be eschewed, leaving support for terrorism as the only alternative. Satisfying 
the Guidance in so far as it coheres with section 26 therefore requires universities to examine 
the views being expressed, or likely to be, in order to determine whether they express violent 
extremism or fall into the category of non-violent extremism viewed as capable of radicalizing 
some listeners, creating a risk that some might then become more susceptible to engaging in 
terrorist-related activity. Clearly, being ‘drawn into terrorism’ covers a range of actions, 
including expressing support for it as a separate terrorist offence, as pointed out in Part B. It 
appears that, if credence is given to HEFCE’s evaluation of university responses, most 
universities are taking the latter, more pragmatic, approach to the Guidance: they are apparently 
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putting in place procedures to evaluate the risk, and using a range of methods of mitigating it. 
The majority do not appear to be assuming that because the future behaviour of audiences 
exposed to the expression of non-British values cannot be predicted with certainty it would 
often be necessary to cancel speaking events.125  
 
Legal status of the Guidance 
 
But uncertainty as to the interpretation of the Guidance, created by its lax wording, creates 
some risk of chilling expression in accordance with the self-censoring dimension of the policy, 
by creating a grey area in relation to free expression on campus.126 In Butt v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, however, the issue was clarified. Butt’s challenge to the lawfulness 
of the Guidance failed,127 partly on the basis that it is merely expressed to be ‘guidance’, and 
section 26 only requires that ‘due regard’ should be given to preventing persons being drawn 
into terrorism. It does not state that the Guidance is binding. It was found that universities must 
‘consider the degree to which they have mitigated the risks [potentially created by a speaking 
event] as fully as they realistically can…But that done, they are not in breach of their duties 
under sections 29, 26 or 31 if they decide to proceed’.128 It was noted that such a decision 
would not comply with the terms of the Guidance but that it is not law, in contrast to the duty 
to uphold free expression under section 31 CTSA (discussed below). It was further found that 
the Guidance is not ultra vires the section 26 duty since it was not found to ‘equate non-violent 
extremism with terrorism’. It was found: ‘If there is some non-violent extremism, however 
intrinsically undesirable, which does not create a risk that others will be drawn into terrorism, 
the guidance does not apply to it,’ but it was not found that the inclusion of non-violent 
extremism went beyond what the Prevent duty lawfully permits so long as in the circumstances 
it could be linked to the risk of drawing persons into terrorism.129   
Where rights to freedom of speech are being curtailed ultimately by force of law, a basic 
understanding of the rule of law obliges the state to express the circumstances in which the 
freedom is lost with a sufficient degree of clarity so as to allow individuals and institutions to 
adjust their behaviours appropriately in order to avoid future proscribed conduct. This 
foundational test might not be found to be satisfied in the present case if the Guidance had a 
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legal or even quasi-legal status, similar, for example, to that of the Codes of Practice made 
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.130 Given that that is not the case, following 
Butt, flexibility as to its interpretation in practice is possible, and the evidence from HEFCE 
suggests that a flexible approach is being taken in universities.131  
 
Conclusions 
 
The section 26 duty as reflected in the Guidance is open to the criticism that it is over-broad 
since if taken at face value it could encourage censorship to occur in the absence of evidence 
that the anticipated speech might aid in drawing persons into terrorism. Conflicting evidence 
is currently available as to the impact of section 26; on the one hand it has reportedly had little 
impact on universities in practice in so far as a large number of ‘extremist’ speakers in 
universities in 2016-17 apparently spoke without the availability of balancing speech or 
debate.132 HEFCE, on the other hand, reported in 2017, on the basis of universities’ self-
assessments of their response to the statutory Prevent duty, that the majority had implemented 
it satisfactorily.133 The government reported to the JCHR in 2018 that it was unaware of any 
cancellations of speaking events in Universities due to Prevent,134 but did not comment on the 
imposition of the requirements for balancing speech, and obviously could not comment on 
speakers who were not invited to speak due to fears that they might be viewed as possible 
extremists. It is also not unreasonable to speculate that, as a consequence of the lack of clarity 
in the Prevent policy, some speakers on-campus who would otherwise criticise government 
policies (including Prevent) may be more inclined to exercise self-censorship.  
 
E. Student ‘no-platforming’ and ‘safe space’ practices 
 
Formal and informal curbs on speakers at student events 
 
There is evidence that informal student ‘no-platforming’ and ‘safe space’ practices have a 
greater restrictive impact on free expression than is created by the Prevent duty,135 although 
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that is not to say that the duty is disregarded by Student Unions (SUs). One SU which gave 
evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ in 2018 said, referring to Prevent, that ‘a 
lack of clarity regarding which views might be considered extremist, and the lengthy 
bureaucracy required to record and investigate events–particularly those which involve 
external speakers–have resulted in both students and staff self-censoring’.136 But such impact 
as Prevent may be having on SUs seems to be transcended by the effect of compliance with 
Charity Commission Guidance and with non-Prevent-related provisions of the section 43 
Codes (JCHR, 2018).137 
 
While both student unions and universities are charities, English universities are exempt from 
registration with the Charity Commission since they have another principal regulator, which 
was HEFCE, but is now the Office for Students. So they are not principally regulated by the 
Commission. But since student unions are not exempt it directly regulates them.138 That means 
that the Commission’s Operational Guidance may be having some stifling impact on their free 
speech since it provides that student unions should not comment publicly on issues which do 
not affect the welfare of students as students’.139 Since most student societies are affiliated to 
student unions the Guidance may be having some impact going beyond that of its effect on 
SUs themselves.  
 
Further, the Commission issued guidance in 2013, ‘Protecting charities from harm,’ which 
inter alia provides: ‘all charities must work for the public benefit and must act to avoid damage 
to the charity’s reputation…All charities, including higher education institutions, debating 
societies and student unions can be challenged on whether they have given due consideration 
to the public benefit and associated risks when they, or one of their affiliated societies, invite 
controversial or extremist speakers to address students’. 140  The Guidance is stated to be 
intended ‘to help them protect their charities from abuse by anyone encouraging or condoning 
extremism, terrorism or illegal activity’.141 ‘Extremism’ is stated to be defined as in the Prevent 
strategy Guidance; however, as indicated above, that Guidance now needs to be up-dated in 
the light of Butt. But as a result, at present, under the 2013 Guidance student unions as charities 
are required not to provide ‘a platform for the expression or promotion of extremist views’ 
which are stated to be ‘views which are harmful to social cohesion, such as denigrating those 
of a particular faith’. 142 
 
The Charity Commission Guidance is binding on the trustees when framing and carrying out 
the purpose of the trust. So it is more likely to have an impact in curbing free speech on campus 
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than the Prevent Guidance once the impact of the Butt case becomes apparent since it is 
binding,143 whereas it is now clear that the Prevent Guidance is not. The Guidance as to 
extremist speakers would appear to be in tension with the indirect effect on SUs of university 
free speech duties, and with any duty to uphold free speech flowing from the educational 
purpose of the trust,144 given that such a duty is not captured expressly in the Guidance.   
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ 2018 Report found that the Commission Guidance is 
having a chilling effect on student speaking events since student unions were apparently 
uncertain as to what they considered they could comment on. It also heard evidence, however, 
to the effect that, ‘it is possible [legally speaking] to take the view that this guidance is intended 
to be solely directed to public comment by trustees or other organs of the union with the power 
to bind the union to action’. 145  The Committee found that to an extent this Guidance 
encouraged a ‘risk averse’ approach to inviting controversial speakers by SUs146 and that while 
cautioning against inviting such speakers, it failed to stress the countervailing need to preserve 
freedom of expression. As pointed out below, the free speech duties of universities, stemming 
from section 43 of the 1986 Act, section 31 CTSA and section 6 HRA, can be found to extend 
to SUs and, by extension, to affiliated student societies, but there is no equivalent to those 
provisions in the Guidance.  
 
The result appears to be that a grey area has been created in which speech has at times been 
stifled, but it should not be assumed that all SUs or student societies are reacting to the 
uncertainty created in a uniform fashion. Some may adopt a risk averse approach to all 
speakers, but, given that ‘extremist’ speakers have clearly spoken in universities recently, as 
this article has detailed, some may interpret terms such as ‘extremism’ or ‘social cohesion’ to 
suit their own political/ideological affiliations.  In any event, the impact of the Charity 
Commission Guidance and other formal curbs on student-led speaking events may be dwarfed 
by the effect of a range of ideological concerns viewed as more pressing by some student 
groups.  
 
No-platforming 
 
The term ‘no platforming’ has been used to cover a range of actions leading to creating 
restraints on external speakers. The term has been used in the media to cover decisions to 
withdraw invitations from speakers due to their views, to disinvite speakers due to pressure 
from other students who oppose the speaker’s views,147 or to impose onerous restrictions on 
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speakers.148 A high-profile example in 2016 concerned an attempt to bar Peter Tatchell from a 
university debate: the organisers of a talk at Canterbury Christ Church University on the topic 
of ‘re-radicalising queers’, received emails from the NUS’s lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender representative, refusing an invitation to speak unless Tatchell, another invitee, did 
not attend. She cited Tatchell’s signing of an open letter in the Observer in 2015 in support of 
free speech and against the growing trend of universities to ‘no-platform’ certain speakers, 
such as Germaine Greer, claiming that the letter supported the incitement of violence against 
transgender people.149 The attempt to bar Tatchell, however, eventually failed; she therefore 
withdrew.  
 
Most obviously, the term covers NUS decisions, or those of individual student societies, to ban 
external speakers/groups from speaking at universities,150 or to refuse to share a platform with 
them. Resting principally upon concerns that the speech of supporters of the far-right and 
certain Islamic groups create (even within existing legal constraints) a threatening milieu on 
campus, the NUS’s ‘No Platform’ policy, for example, is intended to secure a ‘safe 
environment’ for NUS members, partly by reducing the potential for conflict among different 
student groups. This long-standing policy (operative since 1974) means that currently NUS 
officers will not share a platform with six groups known to hold racist or fascist views;151 they 
are: Al-Muhajiroun; British National Party (BNP); English Defence League (EDL); Hizb-ut-
Tahir; Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC) and National Action. They are therefore 
barred from speaking at NUS events. Curiously, the list still includes the British National Party 
and the English Defence League who have largely imploded and whose former members (or 
some of them) now profess allegiance to National Action. Al-Muhajiroun was proscribed in 
2010, National Action in 2016, so it would in any event be a criminal offence under section 
12(2)(c) Terrorism Act 2000 to arrange or help to arrange a meeting allowing their members 
to speak. Individual decisions to ban particular individuals or groups on a list agreed by the 
National Conference every year are made by each student union across the country on a 
majority vote.152 But individual unions can and do reject speakers on an individual basis.153 A 
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wide range of examples was given in the JCHR Report 2018 of SUs placing barriers in the way 
of talks organized by student societies, especially those organized by Secular, Atheist or 
Humanist societies, on the basis that religious groups might be offended. Talks putting forward 
pro-life viewpoints, or those deemed transphobic, also attracted opposition.154  
 
‘Safe space’ policies 
 
‘No-platforming’ and ‘safe space’ policies are to an extent distinguishable. ‘Safe space’ 
policies for their part typically seek to insulate students from emotional harms caused by speech 
which might be considered offensive, to create space where students feel comfortable in 
expressing certain views that relate to questions of personal identity. Persons, regardless of 
whichever race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, they choose to identify with are thus 
offered a tolerant environment in which to express/explore that identity. The guarantee of 
tolerance means that those that might express themselves in ways that indicate a lack of respect 
must be excluded from the space in which these identity-privileging interactions occur. In this 
sense the notion of creating ‘safe spaces’ is broader than that of no-platforming and 
encompasses that concept since ‘safe spaces’ could be created by a range of methods, including 
that of no-platforming persons. They can also cover restrictions on student expression as part 
of an audience. For example, at Edinburgh University in 2016 a student was threatened with 
ejection from a meeting after she raised her hand and shook her head in disagreement with a 
speaker. It was said that her actions violated the ‘safe space’ policy which prohibited such 
gestures. 155  
 
A good example of the censoring effects of a ‘safe space’ policy occurred when Goldsmiths 
College, University of London cancelled the booking of comedian Kate Smurthwaite. The 
cancellation occurred when members of the feminist society organized a picket of her 
performance.156 They objected to her stance on sex workers since Smurthwaite was known for 
her support of the Nordic regulatory approach in which male users of sex workers are 
criminalised rather than the sex workers themselves. To some in the feminist society at 
Goldsmiths, this meant that Smurthwaite was ‘whorephobic’, and the comedian was informed 
that sex workers, who were included in the safe spaces policy, might be hurt by what she might 
say.   
 
A further well-known example arose when a petition, signed by over 3,000 persons, demanded 
that Germaine Greer be de-invited from giving a lecture at Cardiff University on women in 
political and social life; in the end it did not, however, prevent her from delivering her lecture. 
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She had angered the signatories when she had previously argued that post-operative 
transgender males were not females. Her words were considered ‘inflammatory’ by protestors. 
The organizer of the petition said that Greer had ‘demonstrated misogynistic views towards 
trans-women, including continually misgendering trans-women and denying the existence of 
transphobia altogether’.157 It is not clear whether protestors were seeking to ‘no-platform’ 
Greer or claiming that Cardiff’s Safe Spaces policy should have disbarred her from speaking. 
In similar vein Bristol Student Union is currently considering a motion to ‘Prevent Future 
Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist (TERF) groups from holding events at the university’.158    
 
The evidence from both the Smurthwaite and Greer cases demonstrates that issues relating to 
identity politics are being used (sometimes successfully) to close down a category of speaker 
against whom the most that could be said is that their words might hurt the feelings of 
somebody on campus.159 To their supporters the efforts to curtail such offensive speech is part 
of a broader campaign to challenge the dominance of white, male heterosexual worldviews. In 
attempting to enforce their own view about ideal societal relations, however, they seek a 
closing of debates among students about such matters that is redolent of John Stuart Mill’s 
target in On Liberty - the infallible censor. The threat of protests is one aspect of the self-
generated possibility of campus disorder which can be exploited by student groups to persuade 
universities to de-invite speakers or abandon events.     
 
An extreme version of enforcing ‘safe spaces’ arises when students opposed to a speaker’s 
views seek to silence him or her during or just before a talk.160 Examples include the following. 
In 2007 the Oxford Union debating society president approached Holocaust denier David 
Irving, BNP chairman Nick Griffin and the President of Belarussia, Alexander Lukoshenko, to 
speak at a forthcoming debate.161 In the event, 50 protesters managed to break into the debating 
chamber, delaying the event from starting; the security operation allowed the event to proceed, 
but with a minimised audience. In January 2012 the Atheist, Humanist, and Secularist Society 
organised a talk by Anne-Marie Waters at Queen Mary College, which was abandoned after a 
man burst in and began filming attendees, threatening to kill them if they insulted 
Mohammed.162 A recent well-known example arose when Conservative MP Jacob Rees-Mogg 
spoke at the University of the West of England’s Politics and International Relations society; 
a small group of protesters suddenly appeared in the room, some disguising their faces, and a 
scuffle broke out.163 Their intention was clearly to seek to stop the talk. Rees-Mogg was unhurt 
and the talk proceeded; nevertheless, the incident has clear implications for the maintenance of 
free speech on campus, especially as it could deter some politicians from accepting invitations 
to speak in universities.   
 
Conclusions 
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Parts of the media appear to have expanded the ‘no-platforming’ concept to exaggerate the 
problem of free speech censorship by student societies or individuals within them.164 Equally, 
the impact of the Charity Commission Guidance on student societies in terms of curbing free 
speech should not be exaggerated, since the majority of those responding to a 2018 survey for 
the JCHR did not consider that the censoring of such speech was a problem.165 Nevertheless, 
it is fair to conclude that student ‘no-platform’ and ‘safe space’ policies have contributed 
significantly to a reduction in the range of viewpoints to which students are exposed. The 
imprecision of aspects of the Charity Commission Guidance, combined with the influence of 
Prevent, and the lack of a general statutory duty to uphold free speech applying directly to SUs 
and their affiliates, may have aided in creating an area of uncertainty. It appears to have been 
exploited by some officers of student societies, either to deny certain speakers a platform even 
where the Commission would be very unlikely to see their views as extremist, or to allow a 
platform to others whose views might readily be found to fall within that category. The 
Guidance may therefore have had an influence counter-productive to its expressed aims.  
 
All these ‘no-platforming’ and ‘safe space’ policies obviously lack coercive legal force and so 
must be seen as localised, self-imposed restrictions of speech decided on by student majorities. 
In banning lawful expression, such policies make no effort to ensure content neutrality, or to 
abide by rule of law requirements of consistency and clarity. They therefore tend to bar varying 
forms of dissenting or non-mainstream speech on a highly selective basis on the ground of 
causing offence to some students or of undermining the creation of a safe environment. It is 
clear that the contradiction between the general duty of the Charity Commission to uphold free 
expression under section 6 HRA, and the curbs on expression apparent from its Guidance as it 
affects SUs, require urgent clarification as one aspect of future reforms intended to uphold free 
expression on campus, which may in future be prompted by the work of the Office for 
Students.166  
 
F. Duties of universities to protect free speech and academic 
freedom  
 
A range of statutory duties 
 
Opposing the curbs discussed is a somewhat complex web of statutory duties to uphold free 
speech and academic freedom. The question of seeking to ensure that universities respect 
freedom of expression and academic freedom has been a matter of controversy for some time, 
given that universities are seen as places in which such freedoms are of especial significance 
as enabling challenge to mainstream orthodoxies. Therefore universities have attracted a 
uniquely high level of legislative regulation on this matter compared to other public authorities. 
Section 31 CTSA requires universities to have ‘particular regard’ to the duty to secure freedom 
of speech imposed by section 43(1) of the Education (No 2) Act 1986, when carrying out the 
Prevent duty. Section 31(2)(b) CTSA further requires institutions to have particular regard to 
the importance of academic freedom167 as described in section 202(2)(a) of the Education 
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Reform Act 1988,168 but the section does not provide a right of academic freedom to external 
speakers.169 Importantly, the section also places the same duties on the Secretary of State when 
issuing guidance or when giving directions to universities.  
Section 43(1) emphasises the significance of free speech in universities by imposing a legal 
obligation on those governing them to ‘take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure 
that freedom of speech within the law is secured’ to staff, students and visiting speakers; the 
governing body must also promulgate a Code of Practice setting out procedures relating to 
speaking events.170 But the high profile of universities as creating forums for the airing of 
controversial views also raises the likelihood that protests will occur in respect of visiting 
speakers,171 with which the institutions are ill-equipped to deal, meaning that free expression 
may give way,172 taking account in particular of the public order offences discussed above. The 
Codes of Practice promulgated under section 43 by universities answer to various legal 
demands, including public order ones; they typically provide that notice must be given to 
designated authorities in the university by the organisers, and permission sought in respect of 
gatherings to be held on the premises. The university will then decide whether to impose 
conditions on the gathering.173  
 
The ‘reasonably practicable’ aspect of the section 43 duty 
 
Under section 43(4) universities are under a duty to ‘take such steps as are reasonably 
practicable’ (including where appropriate ‘the initiation of disciplinary measures’) to secure 
compliance with the section 43 duty. The courts have shown some disinclination to interfere 
with universities’ decisions on the meaning of ‘reasonably practicable’ where speech is curbed 
as a result. In R v University of Liverpool, ex p Caesar-Gordon174  the term ‘reasonably 
practicable’ under section 43 was considered in finding that HEIs could ban meetings by 
political groups or inflammatory speakers if there were good reasons to fear disruption on an 
institution’s premises.  
 
The High Court also recently declined to interfere with the University of Southampton’s 
decision to withdraw permission for a planned conference on ‘International Law and the State 
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of Israel’.175  Permission was withdrawn when the university conducted a risk assessment 
(based partly on police evidence) and concluded that the event carried a significant threat of 
disorder. It had received considerable correspondence from a range of pro-Israel and pro-
Palestinian groups who intended to protest at or near the conference, some of which conveyed 
threats of violence against the university, and media interest had made it more likely that further 
external groups would attend. Significantly, the university did not rule out the possibility of a 
similar conference occurring in the future. The Court deferred to the judgment of the university 
after being unable to find fault with the risk assessment. It was also found that it could take 
account of the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and the general state of national alert as external 
factors because they could have led to disorder or violence on campus. 176  This example 
supports the contention that the free speech duties of universities may readily be found to give 
way to other considerations which bear relation, not to the value of the speech in question, but 
to the arbitrary propensity at certain times of certain forms of controversial content to attract 
protests.  
 
Student Unions and affiliates 
 
As mentioned, section 43 does not directly cover student unions, but student organisers of 
speaking events must comply with the requirements of the section 43 Codes, and under section 
43(8) premises they occupy are covered. Further, as the JCHR pointed out in 2018: ‘given the 
obligation on universities to secure free speech on university and student union premises, the 
student union constitutive documents, Memorandum of Understanding with the University, or 
conditions of the student union’s funding grant from their University, will often require the 
union to comply with the university’s free speech duty’.177 The JCHR was not, it appears, 
referring to section 6 HRA and Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, as well as section 43, but the same 
point would clearly apply. In other words, universities’ free speech duties extend indirectly to 
Student Unions and their affiliated societies. The section 6 HRA duty also extends to the 
Charity Commission itself since it is a public authority,178  but, as pointed out above, the 
Commission’s binding Guidance is in tension with those duties in so far as they apply to SUs, 
and the Guidance does not expressly impose obligations to protect free speech on SUs.   
 
Conflicting wording of statutory duties 
 
The University Prevent Guidance fleshes out the obligation to balance the Prevent duty with 
universities’ obligations to ensure freedom of speech and academic freedom,179 but does not 
address the difference between paying ‘particular regard’ to free expression under section 31, 
and ‘having due regard’ under section 26. The contrasting terms were taken in Butt to mean 
that the former duty had been accorded a greater emphasis.180 Clearly, the section 31 duty also 
overlaps with positive and negative duties181 already arising under Articles 10,11 and 9 ECHR 
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protecting freedom of expression, assembly, conscience and religion, applicable to public 
authorities under section 6 Human Rights Act, which obviously includes public universities (as 
having a public function), but not student unions or societies, although they are indirectly 
affected, as discussed below. Articles 10 and 11, as interpreted at Strasbourg, not only apply 
in the university context, but can also influence the interpretation and application of section 31 
CTSA, section 43 of the 1986 Act, and section 202 of the 1988 Act.182  
 
The Prevent duty and Guidance appears to present universities with a conflict in respect of their 
duties to uphold free speech that is left unresolved. But after Butt parts of the Guidance may 
be disapplied on the basis that they do not conform to the law. Moreover, Butt signals that the 
respective section 6 HRA and section 31 duties to protect freedom of expression carry greater 
weight than the safeguarding duty under section 26 of the 2015 Act. The phrasing of section 
6(1) – ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right’ - would even more clearly trump the section 26 duty of having ‘due regard’ 
to the risk of drawing persons into terrorism, than would the duty as expressed under section 
31. This appears to open the possibility of emasculating the latter duty and of leaving 
universities with little guidance as to putting it into practice, a conclusion that strongly supports 
the case for a review of Part 5 as well as of this Guidance.183  
 
Conclusions 
 
This web of statutory duties, applying indirectly to student societies, appears to point away 
from the curbs on speech on campus discussed. But, as discussed in Part B, provisions in certain 
section 43 Codes appear more likely, as pointed out in 2018 by the JCHR, to inhibit free 
expression on campus than to promote it.184 Under the remit of the OfS to protect free speech 
on campus 185  universities will be required to include provisions and practices to protect 
freedom of speech in their constitutional documents as well as in the section 43 Codes,186 but 
it remains to be seen whether that will clarify the position as to free speech duties. The current 
on-campus conflict between restricting and protecting free speech may be exacerbated in future 
if on the one hand further measures to counter extremism are taken due to policy suggestions 
from the new Commission for Countering Extremism, but on the other the duties of universities 
to protect free speech are strengthened under the OfS. But in order to come to some conclusions 
as to the instances in universities in which the demands of free speech duties could be found to 
outweigh the demands created by the curbs discussed, a close examination of the extent to 
                                                 
views. E.g. the duty could apply in the following situation: ‘Muslim Students from Goldsmith’s University Islamic 
Society “heckle and aggressively interrupt” Maryam Namazie talk’ Independent Online, 4.12.15, at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/muslim-students-from-goldsmiths-university-s-islamic-society-
heckle-and-aggressively-interrupt-a6760306.html (accessed 15.4.18). 
182
 Under the HRA, ss2, 3, 6. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU uses similar wording in requiring 
member states to uphold the rights of citizens to freedom of expression and information (Article 11), freedom of 
assembly and association (Article 12), and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 10). For criticism 
of this over-complex scheme see ‘Universities’ Minister: one set of guidelines on free speech needed’ R Adams 
the Guardian 3.5.18. 
183
 As recently called for by the JCHR in 2016 (n 47, [42]) and 2018 (n 8, Conclusions, [8]), and by the former 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (Supplementary written evidence submitted by David Anderson 
QC, to the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into Countering Extremism, 29.1.16).  
184
 See n 8, [87]. 
185
 See n 9 and n 10. The JCHR Report 2018 (n 8) welcomed ‘the OfS’ strong support of free speech’ (Summary). 
186
 See Department for Education, Securing student success: risk based regulation for teaching excellence, social 
mobility and informed choice in higher education, Government consultation on behalf of the OfS – Guidance on 
registration conditions, 19.10.17, p44. 
29 
 
which free speech norms apply to the types of expression that could be constrained follows. 
 
G. Implications of the various curbs on campus expression for free 
speech norms 
 
The various duties to protect free speech on campus considered clearly rely on identifying its 
demands in this context. So the discussion now turns to considering free speech values and 
their reflection in relevant jurisprudence to consider whether or how far the various curbs on 
expression considered, flowing from statutory duties, Guidance, codes of practice, and student 
policies, violate free speech norms in the campus context. Since such curbs, including 
implementation of the section 26 duty, often rely on making a judgment about a speaker in 
advance without necessarily seeing a text of the speech, the discussion below largely covers 
the anticipated ‘extremist’ content of speeches on campus. The term ‘far-right’ will be used 
below for brevity to denote speakers from or associated with groups supportive of 
discrimination against protected groups, including of minority groups within minorities. 
Speakers supportive of ideas associated with groups such as National Action or ISIS tend, from 
the standpoint of defending particular mono-cultures from external influences, to express 
similar anti-democratic, homophobic, sexist, anti-semitic,187 racially or religiously intolerant 
sentiments. But speakers from the secular far-right are unlikely to be invited to universities, so 
section 26, and the other curbs, while potentially applicable to them, are usually not relevant 
in practice. A number of the examples below therefore relate to ‘far-right’ speakers at ISOC 
events due to the nature of student no-platforming policies (although such policies do also 
apply to certain Islamic groups deemed far-right as racist by the NUS).188  
 
The extent of the protection for speech maintained under Article 10 ECHR can clearly be 
criticized, but that standard is the one universities are legally bound to adhere to under section 
6 HRA, and the one that is influential under the other free speech duties. As is well established, 
the term ‘expression’ in Article 10 covers all sorts of expression, including shocking or 
controversial material,189 the spoken or written word, and all forms of media, including web-
sites or images.190 But it is axiomatic that all expression is not equally valued at Strasbourg, or 
domestically, meaning that some speech fails to engage Article 10 at all, or creates only a light 
engagement. Depending on its content, speech is often valued instrumentally — usually for the 
benefits it brings to democratic participation, the search for truth, and self-development.191 It 
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is argued below that reference to such values does not invariably provide a strong defence of 
some forms of campus-related speech that might be caught by the curbs considered. 
 
Anti-democratic expression 
 
The argument from participation in a democracy is well established as the most significant of 
these speech theories192 on the basis that citizens cannot participate fully in a democracy unless 
they have a reasonable understanding of political issues;193 therefore, open debate on such 
matters is essential.194 The term ‘democracy’, or the furtherance of democracy, has not been 
narrowly defined, especially at Strasbourg, to include only according value to allowing 
criticisms of the decisions of the particular government in power, or of politicians or policies 
in general. It has also been found to relate to expression linked to the protection for minorities 
and fundamental freedoms more generally, 195  as related to values implicit in any mature 
conception of a democracy. Racist attacks or attacks on particular religious groups by members 
of far-right secular or faith-based groups could nevertheless count as forms of political speech 
(understood as speech on matters which citizens qua citizens ought to be interested in),196 even 
though such claims challenge other substantive norms such as the equal worth of all citizens. 
Further, speech from such individuals, which avoids incitement to violence, but attacks 
democracy, could be accorded weight on grounds of contributing to debate.197 
 
It is, however, significant in this context that this argument sees speech as a public interest and 
as justified instrumentally by reference to its beneficial effects on democracy, rather than 
seeing it as an individual right of inherent value. It therefore renders speech vulnerable to 
arguments that it should be overridden by competing public interests claimed to be reflected in 
the duty, which could be deemed also to be essential to the maintenance of democracy.198 A 
judge who sees the value of free speech only in terms of its contribution to the political process 
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could readily approve an argument that allowing the speech in question will do more harm than 
good to the maintenance of democracy, given that some expression, whether from far-right 
secular groups or speakers inspired by ISIS or similar groups, has counter-democratic aims. In 
Brind199 it was found that preventing IRA-supporting politicians from speaking directly on air 
by using actors to dub their voices did not violate free speech principles because the content of 
the speech was not affected, merely the manner of its delivery. But a more general argument 
for disallowing air-time entirely to such politicians, stifling their ability to use a very significant 
medium to promulgate their message, would have failed under the application of this 
justification, since the IRA was not attacking democracy per se.  
 
In contrast, it may be argued that some speech of far-right secular or faith-based groups, aimed 
at attacking democracy or democratic values, fails to engage this instrumental justification.200 
Speakers in universities advocating anti-democratic positions, such as that Islam is 
incompatible with democracy, or that Muslims should not vote since candidates are usually 
unbelievers, 201  could be defended in stable democracies such as the UK, as Heinze has 
argued,202 in principle, as the communication of a minority opinion (and thus as a contribution 
to self-government) where it does not carry an actual or implicit threat of violence against 
others.203 Salafism/Wahabism, for example, is openly anti-democratic; the doctrine, which is 
linked to ISIS and similar groups, such as Al-Shabaab, could be viewed as defined by its anti-
democratic stance, and its adherents, which have included certain speakers in universities, have 
sought to dissuade Muslims from voting in elections.204 Speech even of such anti-democratic 
speakers could have some value as providing a contribution to pluralist debate, but 
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Salafist/Wahabist preachers in universities have reportedly at times spoken unchallenged, 
without fostering, or participating in, any debate. 205  It can be concluded that this speech 
rationale would provide little support for speech on campus advocating the anti-democratic 
positions considered if in the circumstances debate and challenges to it were improbable. 
 
At first glance the work of Robert Post, in particular, would not support that conclusion; 
starting from a definition of democracy as active and mediated self-rule by citizens, his view 
is that, for citizens to experience government as their own government, each person must ‘have 
the warranted conviction that they are engaged in the process of governing themselves.’206 A 
vital component of this conviction is the perception that the state is responsive to the values of 
each citizen and that each individual has the potential to influence the outcome of public 
discourse through her ideas and arguments. The individualistic basis of public discourse 
through which each person participates in collective self-determination dictates that the 
freedom of speakers must trump the claims from groups whose feelings are ‘injured’ by speech. 
Where, conversely, expression cedes way to the feelings of others, there is a significant loss to 
the democratic legitimacy of decision-making. On Post’s view, each individual is required to 
demonstrate a degree of fortitude and self-confidence in order to enter the arena of public 
discourse unaided by the state. Otherwise, as Post observes, in large heterogeneous countries 
‘populated by assertive and conflicting groups, the logic of circumscribing political discourse 
to reduce political estrangement is virtually unstoppable.’207 Clearly, this stance would oppose 
not only the thinking behind sections 26-29 CTSA, but also, much more strongly, no-
platforming or safe space policies of student unions or societies. But how far this stance — 
adopted in relation to citizens entering discourse arenas they are also free to withdraw from — 
applies to some minority groups on campus in the face of speech directly attacking them 
without the possibility of challenge is, however, debatable, a point also pursued below.  
 
Speech that is (potentially) antithetical to the pursuit of truth 
 
The placing of value on free speech on the Millian basis of the pursuit of truth,208 might appear 
to apply particularly to the ability of those within universities as centres for debate of diverse 
viewpoints to engage in uninhibited, reasoned, sceptical challenges to a range of established 
ideas. Audience interests in the pursuit of truth are also relevant. Even where a speaker at a 
University event asserts dogmatically that, for example, apostates should be killed, and is 
unwilling to engage with questions putting an opposing view from the audience, that very 
failure to engage may nonetheless enable some audience members to evaluate the speaker’s 
claims in a way that would not have arisen had the speaker been prevented from coming onto 
campus in the first place. To find otherwise might in some instances enable subjective notions 
of offence to play a determinative role in setting the boundaries of speech.209 Mill considered 
that there was value both to the individual and to society if some are caused moral distress 
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when their deeply cherished beliefs are attacked by another.210 The individual, he considered, 
could benefit morally and intellectually from participation in such a confrontation, whilst 
societal progress in moral matters could also occur. In a finding obviously antithetical to the 
student policies considered here, Mill even went so far as to suggest that where no spontaneous 
dissent exists, it might have to be manufactured for the benefits described above to accrue.211  
 
Where, however, the organisers of campus speaking events impliedly or expressly prevent 
questioning of speakers, they could be said to frustrate the purpose of a meeting held on 
campus. There are also practical issues as to safeguarding audience members seeking to pose 
questions espousing views contrary to those of the speaker. As the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights has pointed out, it is ‘also important for universities to ensure that such a debate is 
possible and that students are not too intimidated to challenge visiting speakers on their 
views’.212 Such safeguarding of audience interests in evaluating far-right secular or faith-based 
claims might justifiably entail reliance on material already available in digital and print format 
without the need for a direct face-to-face encounter. 
 
Further, it is arguable that this justification has no ready application to speech that presumes 
that the truth has already been discovered and is opposed to an open search for the truth or to 
an exploration of varying truths, as may be said of speakers in the tradition of ultra-orthodox 
Judaism or Wahabism.213 As Fenwick and Phillipson have pointed out, this argument rests on 
a proposition about a causal relationship between two phenomena — discussion and truth — 
which of course has never been conclusively verified.214 But the underlying assumption, if it is 
accepted, that more free speech will tend to lead to more truth,215 is opposed by the denigration 
of racial groups, including faith groups (and of moderate minorities or opposing sects within 
faith groups), by the far-right, since it could lead to the creation of false and damaging images 
of such groups. The assumption therefore that truth is most likely to emerge from free and 
uninhibited discussion and debate, has, it might appear, only a weak application to some speech 
from the secular and faith-based far-right. In the context therefore of a collision between free 
speech and denigration of minority groups, there may be thought to be little intrinsic value in 
hearing directly from a preacher on campus, if speaking unchallenged, that Shia Muslims are 
the enemy of the Muslim community.  
 
The self-fulfillment justification for speech promulgating damaging images of minorities 
 
There are also difficulties in defending, for example, Wahabist expression on the separate 
justificatory basis that it facilitates individual self-fulfillment. Speech can be justified as 
fostering human self-development and growth, including intellectual development aided by 
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access to information, ideas and free debate with others.216 But some speech on campus runs 
counter to the outcome - intellectual development - which promoting freedom of expression 
and academic freedom on campus is designed to ensure. For example, the ideology of Wahabi 
preachers/lecturers finds that women are subordinate to men and that ‘unbelievers’ include not 
only all non-Muslims, but also Shia and Sufi Muslims,217 as well as Sunni Muslims who do 
not accept Wahabi doctrine. On that Wahabist view all such groups should not be accepted as 
Muslims or tolerated by Muslim communities,218 while Westerners should be entirely shunned. 
‘Dehumanisation of the enemy’ thus features in some Wahabi discourse, and could also 
correlate with lowering inhibitions to engagement in terrorist activity.219 The argument from 
self-development struggles to justify the protection of material which is demeaning to 
girls/women, to a range of minorities and to minority groups within minorities.220  
 
The position might differ if those holding an opposing view, including female students, were 
at all times able to speak and challenge such speakers. However, reportedly, women tend 
impliedly or expressly to be discouraged from participating in campus speaking events 
(especially to challenge the speaker) run by Salafist/Wahabi-dominated ISOCs221 to further 
that agenda. That is on the basis that the Wahabi preacher (invariably male) may have 
discretion over who is allowed to speak and also deemed to have greater authority, both as a 
man and a cleric than female students.222 If such a speaker was de-invited from a campus 
speaking event a potential infringement of Article 10 could be justified under paragraph 2 on 
the basis that the expression in question would be likely to interfere with the expression rights 
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of others223 and to foster discrimination on grounds of gender. 
 
The Strasbourg Court has not found that interference with speech that is merely offensive to 
minority groups can be justified under Article 10, if it qualifies as political expression, as in 
the case of speech from the far-right, whether from secular or faith-based speakers. So a student 
policy barring, for example, certain feminist speakers as transphobic or whorephobic on 
grounds of causing offence would not be justified. But, taking account of Article 9, the Court 
has created a concerning category of gratuitously offensive expression aimed at religious 
groups, susceptible to a fairly ready justification.224 That category would cover, for example, 
speech attacking Muslims or Jews from far-right speakers, or aimed at one sect of a religion by 
an opposing sect, but it would not cover barring secular speakers from campus speaking events 
by student societies merely on the basis that their presence might offend religious groups.  
 
The role of Article 17 ECHR225 should also be considered since it is of significance in relation 
to expression attacking minorities; the Article disallows Convention protection to groups or 
individuals seeking destruction of the ECHR principle of according equal dignity to all. Article 
17 reflects an acceptance of limitations on speech where its impact undermines the 
consequentialist justifications for its own protection, and some of the viewpoints under 
discussion, potentially curbed on campus, could fall within it. This approach, setting limits on 
the protection provided by Article 10, differs from the limits provided for under Article 10(2); 
it is adopted where the speech in question could qualify as hate speech, and therefore 
restrictions on it would usually be justified under paragraph 2, but if it is deemed also to be apt 
to destroy the fundamental values of the Convention 226  the tests of necessity and 
proportionality may not be applied as rigorously. This jurisprudence is open to attack as 
allowing political expression to be abrogated too readily, but its application is arguably more 
defensible in the campus context due to the greater propensity of such speech to create 
intimidation or the risk of radicalization in that restricted environment,227 an environment 
within which specific duties of ensuring non-discrimination must be discharged. 
 
In a number of decisions the Strasbourg Court has refused to offer protection to speech 
attacking racial or religious groups,228 relying on Article 17. It has found: ‘[T]olerance and 
respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, 
pluralistic society…so, as a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain 
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify hatred based on intolerance…provided that any [restrictions]…imposed are 
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proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’229 In Norwood v UK,230 for example, a BNP 
poster attacking Islam, and linking the religion as a whole with 9/11, was not found to be 
covered by Article 10(1) since Article 17 was found to apply: the interference with the 
expression in question did not need to be justified due to the nature of the speech; it failed to 
receive even very light protection.231 In DPP v Collins232 Lord Bingham found that effect must 
be given to Article 17 in finding that interfering with racist speech by criminalising it was 
justified. Similarly, speech attacking non-Muslims has been found to fall outside Article 10 
protection.233 
 
Article 17 might therefore be relied on to justify a withdrawal by a student society, or under 
Part 5, of invitations to speak from speakers intending to attack Islam or, alternatively, non-
Muslims. So doing would also cohere with a university’s equality duty and probably with its 
section 43 Code. The potential of the Article to exclude certain viewpoints from the public 
domain is, however, a matter of concern since so doing could deny non-mainstream speakers 
a chance to participate in and shape public discourse, while possibly leaving open space for 
more hidden, divisive and insidious narratives from far-right faith-based or secular groups. 
Where no immediate threat is posed to societal institutions or public peace, the Court’s reliance 
on Article 17 to refuse to scrutinize national authorities’ restrictions closely has lent itself to a 
restrictive stance.234  
 
The Strasbourg stance discussed, however, including the approach taken to Article 17, finds 
some justification in respect of the self-fulfillment rationale, as well as the promotion of 
equality on campus. A far-right secular or faith-based speaker/preacher may be unable to 
develop to his full intellectual and moral potential unless he is free to communicate his views 
and ideas to others.235 However, if Speaker A’s freedom of expression by its very utterance 
hinders the intellectual and moral development of student B, and seeks to silence her or exclude 
her from public life,236 it is by no means clear on self-fulfillment grounds why Speaker A’s 
communicative freedoms should trump student B’s interests in being shielded from Speaker 
A’s message, bearing the campus context in mind. Therefore, where it seems that allowing free 
expression of the particular viewpoint, would be likely (where robust debate and counter-
arguments are not allowed or impliedly discouraged) to retard or hinder the growth of others 
in the campus setting, the justification does not offer a strong defence of speech.237 As Barendt 
has argued, justifications for suppressing some forms of speech can be advanced on the basis 
that human dignity (the value promoted by allowing self-development) would thereby receive 
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protection.238  
 
H. Taking account of free speech values in practice in universities in relation 
to Prevent or Charity Commission Guidance 
 
The argument that some anticipated speech of visiting speakers on-campus can have an impact 
that runs counter to promoting consequentialist free speech values should influence the 
procedure adopted in response, either by the university authorities under Prevent or by SUs 
following Charity Commission Guidance on extremism. But, clearly, it is not inevitably the 
case that such speech, whether from the secular or faith-based far-right, could be deemed to 
contribute to radicalization of students, or to create a risk of drawing them towards terrorist 
activity. The Prevent duty also covers, under the Guidance, speech expressing views ‘shared 
by terrorist groups’, meaning that Charity Commission Guidance would cover such speech as 
well. Speech, for example, attacking homosexuality might be viewed as of low quality in terms 
of the speech justifications discussed, but its propensity to draw students towards terrorism 
might be doubted. Such attacks constitute the expression of views also shared by certain 
terrorist groups, including National Action 239  and ISIS, but, if expressing non-violent 
extremism, would, following Butt, only be covered by section 26 if it had the ability to 
contribute to drawing students towards terrorism. The expression of hatred towards certain 
faith groups could perhaps more readily fall within either the ‘shared views’ or ‘risk of drawing 
persons towards terrorism’ terminology, if it could contribute to the risk that students might be 
drawn towards far-right secular groups plotting attacks on Muslims, or to the targeting of Jews 
by certain Islamic groups.  
 
The possibility of radicalizing some students would appear to be higher where the views are 
put forward as insulated from critical debate. It cannot be ruled out that once radicalized some 
of them might then be more susceptible to being drawn into terrorist activity240 although, as 
discussed, the causal link between the type of speech in question and the drawing of students 
into terrorism has not been fully established. So the discussion below proceeds on the basis 
that some speech on campus viewed as of low quality in terms of the speech rationales may 
tend also to fall within Prevent or Charity Commission Guidance. The use of risk assessments 
and of mitigating actions in relation to it could arguably be justifiable under Article 10 in the 
campus context, taking account of the dangers of contributing to radicalization. 
 
Making a Risk assessment 
 
In evaluating the level of risk presented by a speaker one difficulty lies in predicting in advance 
the range of ideas that at-risk speakers might intend to put forward. The past utterances of a 
speaker might indicate that a talk would be very likely to be intimidatory/denigratory towards 
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certain minority groups (or minorities within minorities), and unsusceptible to criticism or de-
bate. So the signs that vetting procedures should be triggered would include the fact that a 
speaker had previously attacked groups on grounds of sexuality, religion, race or sex, or had 
supported terrorism, and would also be expected to take account of the group or organization 
of which the speaker is a member of former member. HEFCE has recommended that specialist 
training should be put in place for staff involved in booking and approving events.241 
 
Mitigating actions taking account of free speech duties 
 
As discussed, universities are, on one interpretation of the Guidance, being asked to achieve 
the impossible: to predict how a range of persons will respond to a speaker. The emphasis upon 
‘full mitigation’ could clearly signal to a risk-averse university that it should incline towards 
the cancellation of a controversial speaker. However, after Butt it can disregard that emphasis 
as appearing only in the Guidance242 and instead consider a range of mitigating actions in order 
to avoid violation of its section 6 HRA, section 31 or section 43 duties.  The decisions discussed 
above under Article 10 were largely concerned with those instances in which speech attacking 
certain groups or inciting terrorism had already occurred; the key question was whether the 
words in question did constitute an attack, although Strasbourg has not ruled out the use of 
prior restraint against forms of hate speech.243 So determinations as to mitigating actions should 
as a starting point include ‘more speech’ solutions, such as ensuring that the chair of a speaking 
event can provide balance and allow debate, or ensuring that a balanced platform is put in place 
by ensuring that a speaker opposed to the views of the original speaker speaks at the same 
event. HEFCE recommended in 2017 that universities should ensure that the selection and 
training for chairs of events would mean that they would be equipped to enable challenge and 
debate.244 A university could also put ‘codes of conduct’ in place communicated to speakers in 
advance to ensure that they were aware of institutional values and expectations, including the 
need to adhere to the equality duty. Such solutions may have some inhibiting impact on 
expression due to the bureaucracy involved since decisions as to the selection of speakers might 
be influenced. But if the speech rationales are unlikely to be strongly engaged by the speech, 
use of such mitigating actions would mean that conflict between the duties stemming from 
section 26 or Charity Commission Guidance, and the free speech duties of universities and of 
student societies, could be minimized. 
 
If an opposing speaker or chair could not be identified as available and acceptable to the society 
that had invited the original speaker, a university Prevent officer or SU representative could 
ask to see an abstract or text of the speech beforehand in order to make the evaluation as to 
mitigation. As mentioned, a requirement to see a text was dropped from the Guidance on free 
speech grounds. But if, in the circumstances, cancellation of the speech appeared to be the only 
alternative, failing to ask for the text of the talk beforehand instead could have a greater adverse 
impact on expression, failing the test of proportionality under Article 10(2), and also therefore 
risking failure to satisfy the statutory free speech duties. The lack of such a requirement in the 
non-legally binding Guidance would therefore be irrelevant. While the Charity Commission’s 
2013 Guidance does not set out specific methods of meeting the duty to deny a platform to 
extremist speech, adherence to such a requirement by a student group, rather than merely 
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banning a speaker, would equally provide a means of satisfying the free speech demands 
indirectly imposed on student societies. Clearly, considering the content of a talk before 
determining whether a speaker should be de-invited, would mean accepting content-based 
restrictions on expression, although obviously the speaker in question would be free — subject 
to the general criminal law — to post the text online or disseminate it by other means. 
 
Cancellation of a speaking event 
 
If despite attempts to adopt mitigating actions they failed because, for example, a speaker 
deemed high-risk refused to provide an abstract or text of the speech in advance, cancellation 
of the event might be found to be the only alternative, although in Butt it was found that once 
a university had considered and attempted to deploy such actions the section 26 duty could be 
found to be fulfilled and cancellation would not be the inevitable next step.245  
 
If cancellation occurred by a student society following Charity Commission Guidance on 
extremism, or by University authorities under Prevent, meaning that a speaker from the secular 
far-right, or a preacher in the Salafi/Wahabi tradition, did not speak on campus, the damage 
done to free expression might appear to be minimal. As discussed in Part G, the campus context 
is relevant: creation of an invasion of moral autonomy, and of denigration in terms of self-
fulfilment, may arise if a member of a minority is forced to witness unchallenged expression 
intimidatory or directly denigratory towards that minority. 246  That could occur where the 
speech was so pervasive as to be unavoidable, given the lack of choice accorded to students 
who have to use campus buildings, or because it is likely that a student will encounter it 
unwittingly as a member of the audience (or, for example, in the case of posters or postings on 
social media advertising a forthcoming speech on campus likely to attack Shia Muslims).247 
The case for restricting such expression is stronger where it occurs in a context in which there 
have been recent intimidatory incidents aimed at individuals belonging to a group on the basis 
of their membership of that group.248 For example, a far-right speaker denouncing gender 
equality may also be conveying a host of emotive and cognitive messages via gesture and tone 
of voice, conveyed with greater immediacy in person. But the impact of such messages in the 
restricted environment of a campus where intimidation of some female students was already 
occurring undermines the value that might be attached to the speech on instrumental grounds, 
bearing the safeguarding and equality duties of universities in mind, also reflected in the section 
43 Codes.  
 
 
I. Conclusions 
Taking account of the conflicting duties of universities, and (although the conflict is less stark) 
of SUs and their affiliates, we have argued above that there is a case for restricting expression 
                                                 
245 See n 127. 
246
 Cf the famous ‘Nazis at Skokie’ affair: Collin v Smith (1978) 578 F 2d 1197, 7th Cir. 
247
 That would be analogous with the facts of Norwood (n 230 above). In Vejdeland, n 54, [56] it was found: ‘The 
Court also takes into consideration that the [homophobic] leaflets were left in the lockers of young people who 
were at an impressionable and sensitive age and who had no possibility to decline to accept them’. 
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 As in the case of attacks on religious faith or homophobic, racist or sexist expression targeted directly at 
specific individuals including: putting up posters impliedly threatening to Muslims or to gay students; sexist, 
homophobic or racist remarks posted on social media; mounting a racist campaign by eg putting up leaflets or 
stickers associated with National Action. See for examples, n 43 and n 221.  
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cognate with that of certain terrorist groups, including National Action or ISIS.249 That has also 
been found, more controversially, where it would create/add to an (already) intimidatory 
environment for certain groups of students – who are sometimes minorities within minorities. 
The Guidance associated with section 26, however, goes beyond such qualified incursions into 
freedom of speech on campus, as Butt made clear, in terms of its potential impact, as does the 
Charity Commission Guidance. Both are therefore in need of revision, and there are signs that 
such revision may be imminent. The Prevent Guidance to universities creates a scheme that is 
both over-broad and imprecise, given its focus on anticipation of risk, on ‘extremism’, and on 
uncertain causal links between exposure to ‘extreme’ expression, radicalization, and likelihood 
of engagement in terrorism.250 While it can be disapplied, the current lack of clarity is a matter 
of concern and is exacerbated by student policies that create an appearance of distortion to the 
impact of Part 5: speech from the secular far-right tends not to be caught by Prevent since the 
speakers are already likely to be no-platformed by student bodies. As applied on campus, 
Prevent might therefore appear disproportionately to target content that endorses a minority 
Islamic viewpoint, whilst leaving untouched forms of secular far-right expression. It is 
therefore susceptible to exploitation by anti-Prevent lobby groups,251 reinforcing the case for 
reform of the Guidance in light of Butt and for attempting to create greater transparency as to 
its impact in practice. 
 
It has been argued that taken at face value the combined effect of Part 5 CTSA and the 
associated Guidance constitute an imprecisely-stated, viewpoint-based assault on notions of 
free inquiry and challenges to received opinion. When set alongside restrictions flowing from 
the Charity Commission Guidance and student-imposed ‘No Platform’ and ‘Safe spaces’ 
policies, an observer could be forgiven for thinking that the freedom to challenge current 
orthodoxies (including radical critiques of government policy) on campus is currently in 
jeopardy, caught in a pincer attack due to the combined policies of the government and of 
student unions and societies.252 A campus-based orthodoxy might appear to be arising instead, 
with chilling effect. 
 
The binary nature of the responses to the Prevent duty is also itself detrimental to the protection 
of free expression in universities and to management of the risk of radicalisation. The view that 
all Muslim students or ISOCs without distinction should be viewed as part of a suspect 
community is contemptible and impoverished, but the opposing view that such students, 
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 A conviction in respect of apologism for terrorism may give rise to a breach of Article 10 if it arises in the 
context of political debate and does not amount to hate speech or incite violence: see Faruk Temel v Turkey App 
no 16853/05, judgment of 1 February 2011. But a conviction in respect of a cartoon supporting and glorifying the 
violent destruction of the US, and expressing moral support for the perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11, was not 
found to create such a breach: Leroy v France App No 36109/03, judgment of 2 Oct 2008, because it approved of 
the violence perpetrated against civilians. 
250
 Home Affairs Select Committee (n 96), 2016, [18]: ‘If the Government adopts a broad-brush approach, which 
fails to take account of the complexities, and of the gaps in…understanding of the factors contributing to 
radicalisation, that would be counter-productive and fuel the attraction of the extremist narrative rather than 
dampening it.’ See also A.Z. Huq, T.R. Tyler, and S.J. Schulhofer, ‘Mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in 
counterterrorism policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom’ Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 8, no 4 (2011), 
728-61. 
251
 The Casey Review, 2016 (n 220) described ‘an active lobby opposed to Prevent’. She found that ‘elements of 
this lobby…appear to have an agenda to turn British Muslims against Britain’, whose activism to undermine 
Prevent she describes as making British Muslims ‘feel even more alienated and isolated – and therefore more 
vulnerable to extremists and radicalisers’. 
252
 For a survey of students’ attitudes towards free speech on campus, see N. Hillman, Keeping Schtum? What 
students think of free speech (Wave 2, HEPI/YouthSight Monitor) (2016, HEPI Report 85). 
41 
 
regardless of religious sect, personal predilections or cultural background, are victimized by 
Prevent and uniformly reject the ‘British values’ it relies on is also damaging and counter-
productive in terms of combatting both Islamophobia and radicalisation. Rigidly poised 
between accusations of Islamophobia253 or suppression of expression on the one hand,254 and 
a heightened fear of terrorism and radicalization in universities on the other, focusing 
unquestioningly only on Islamism,255 little space is left for reasoned discourse on this matter 
that could point student groups and universities towards a flexible and nuanced response to 
both secular and faith-based far-right speech. In evaluating the true speech value of some forms 
of campus-related expression alongside a critique of the forces, including the Prevent duty, 
allowing their suppression, this article has made a contribution towards expanding that space 
and filling a significant lacuna in the literature. 
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